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Guidance on type of review and how to read this report 
Methodological approach  
This report presents the findings from the first part of a realist review. The review uses 
systematic methods to identify and critically assess study relevance to inform the 
development of theories about how a complex intervention, such as compensation 
schemes for injury, might operate. The theories take the form of ‘context’, ‘mechanisms’ 
and ‘outcomes’ (CMO) configurations seeking to provide explanatory accounts of what 
compensation schemes might look like and how they might work. The text describing each 
CMO configuration is the theoretical and empirical justification for the proposed theories, 
representing a transparent argument based on the literature identified. The second part 
of a realist review, not undertaken here, seeks more definitively to answer questions 
about the effectiveness of each CMO configuration proposed. As a type of systematic 
review, the purpose of this first half of a realist review is to develop readers’ thinking 
about what CMOs might affect outcomes. It is a review which generates theories about 
why something might work or not; however, it does not seek to establish whether an 
intervention is effective or not.  
Our searches focused on finding a variety of explanations for the observed outcomes, but 
we did not seek to include studies that repeated these explanations. These excluded 
studies could be brought together to establish the validity of the explanations in the 
second stage of the realist process. Accordingly, our included studies were not assessed 
for their risk of methodological bias, since we were not aiming to validate causal 
relationships. Like any type of qualitative research synthesis, a realist review seeks to 
consider critically the salience of study findings; i.e. the contribution each study makes to 
the review question in terms of variety of examples (richness) and exploration of meaning 
(depth). In a systematic review designed to generate theoretical hypotheses, this type of 
critical assessment of studies is argued to be more appropriate (Carroll and Booth, 2015; 
Lewin et al., 2015; Mays and Pope, 2000).  
Scope of the review  
This review was commissioned by the Department of Health, London with a policy focus 
primarily on the introduction of an administrative compensation scheme relevant to 
injuries occurring during birth. However, due to a lack of policy and research literature 
specific to this area, much of the evidence is drawn from compensation schemes 
concerned with other types of medical and non-medical injury. Thus, some of the findings 
are not directly transferrable to birth injury. Furthermore, the review’s primary focus is 
compensation schemes which do not require claimants to establish fault; however, the 
review also extends to compensation schemes which provide an alternative to litigation 
based on the principles of ‘no fault’, ‘no blame’ or ‘avoidable harm’. 
Report structure  
As this is the technical report of the first part of a realist review, using transparent 
methods, some sections of the report are necessarily detailed. Without compromising on 
the transparency that is expected of a systematic review, we have structured this report 
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to help those who are more concerned with the findings than the methods. Therefore: the 
report is organised in three sections:  
1. Evidence summaries: A two-page abstract and an executive summary of the key 
findings  
2. Part I: This contains the CMO theories in full (chapter 3), preceded by the 
background, aims and a brief section on methods (Chapters 1-2). Chapter 3 also 
includes an overview of the papers informing the review. The findings are presented 
in turn for each outcome, and include a hypothetical statement of the context and 
mechanisms thought to influence outcomes. Part I concludes with a summary of the 
CMO configurations, in addition to the strengths, limitations and implications of the 
review.  
3. Part II contains additional detail about the methods and how papers were 
identified, screened for inclusion and examined in the review, as well as appendices 
that contain further details of the papers, the review’s search strategy and the 
coding tools used. 
Abstract 
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Structured Summary  
What do we want to know? 
At present in the UK, compensation for medical injuries can be sought through tort 
litigation, with payouts made through court or out-of-court settlements. No-fault 
compensation schemes (NFCSs) can provide an alternative method to redress claims 
resulting from medical injury. To inform consideration of an administrative compensation 
scheme relevant to birth injuries, we sought to develop preliminary theoretical 
frameworks describing the mechanisms that might influence engagement in such schemes 
and lead to improvements in outcomes for affected individuals and families. We 
conducted the first part of a realist review, which seeks to identify empirically and 
theoretically-based contextual, mechanism and outcome (CMO) configurations. We did not 
test the CMO configurations, so no causal claims are made. Thus, the findings should be 
read in this light, and should not be interpreted as definitive evidence that the CMO 
configurations presented below do influence engagement or outcomes. 
What did we find? 
We drew on 44 papers relating to medical and non-medical injury, to present a summary 
of possible mechanisms entailed in no-fault compensation and tort reform that are 
thought to lead to patient and clinical practice outcomes (see Table A).  
Table A: Context mechanism outcome configurations  
Outcomes Context and mechanism potentially influencing outcomes  
Justice 1: Access to 
courts 
To make compensation schemes attractive to claimants, they must 
offer payment and broader eligibility criteria, to ensure schemes 
remain more appealing than the tort-based system. 
Justice 2: Equality of 
access 
NFCSs that are free to access improve justice outcomes in that they 
are accessible to all eligible parties, unlike the tort system, which 
favours those who can afford legal representation. 
Justice 3: 
Transparency of 
process 
Transparency of process achieves justice through the 
representation of the claimant, and mechanisms that improve the 
consistency of decision making through the use of medical experts 
and the consideration of precedents. 
Justice 4: 
Compensation 
decoupled from 
disciplinary 
procedures 
Creating a ‘Chinese wall’1 between compensation procedures and 
disciplinary procedures enables improved access to justice and a 
more efficient compensation scheme, since physicians are more 
ready to hand over the relevant information. 
Clinical practice 1: 
Defensive medicine 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests and procedures 
and improve access to health care for patients considered ‘riskier’ 
by clinicians, because doctors are less likely to practise positive 
and/or negative defensive medicine2 to protect themselves from 
litigation. 
                                            
1 A barrier that separates two or more groups, usually as a means of restricting the flow of information 
 
2 Positive defensive medicine: when clinicians attempt to protect themselves by being over-cautious in their 
practice.  Negative defensive medicine: restricting or denying care or treatment to patients considered too 
‘riskier’ by clinicians. 
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Outcomes Context and mechanism potentially influencing outcomes  
Patient safety 1: 
Admitting to error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling physicians to disclose 
iatrogenic injury through the removal of personal liability, applying 
the avoidability criterion and decoupling compensation from 
disciplinary procedures. 
Patient safety 2: 
Learning from error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling the pooling and sharing 
of information about medical errors and by reframing the 
compensation process as a patient safety strategy rather than a risk 
management strategy. 
Health 1: Physical 
health 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the physical health of patients by 
shortening the length of time to claim closure and by including a 
rehabilitative element in the award. 
Health 2: Mental 
health 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the mental health of patients by 
shortening the length of time to claim closure and by removing the 
adversarial element of the tort system. 
 
 Overall, we found varied conceptualisations of NFCSs in different geographical 
contexts, and papers that discussed the effects of tort reform with comparable 
effects.  
 Liability was the key variable in schemes, with the concept of ‘blame’ shaping those 
schemes:  
o In France, the compensation scheme was an expression of solidarity with 
individuals who had suffered major injury (Barbot et al. 2014) but retained the 
notion of blame and the litigation process for those patients who could 
establish liability.  
o In New Zealand, the scheme operated like a targeted social security benefit 
programme with its broad eligibility criterion of ‘treatment injury’ (Kachalia et 
al. 2008).  
o In the United States, tort reform seemed to be the reluctant consequence of a 
breakdown in the compensation system when doctors could no longer afford 
the insurance premiums and were leaving the profession (Kessler n.d.).  
 There is evidence to suggest that the schemes were a product of their jurisdictions. For 
example: 
o In New Zealand and Scandinavia, the creation of a state-run compensation 
scheme fitted with their conception of health care as an important provision by 
central government.  
o  In the United States, there was understandable reluctance to deny claimants 
the possibility of attaining damages through the court process, since there was 
less of a social security safety net to support individuals with ongoing ill health 
and disability.  
 The empirical research attempted to test the effect of no-fault schemes and tort 
reform as outlined in Table A. The findings from this research underpinned 
propositions to explain the observed effects of no-fault schemes and tort reform. 
These propositions suggested reasons for:  
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o more precise targeting of compensation to reach beneficiaries (Davis et al. 
2002)  
o possible impacts on physical and mental health outcomes (Cameron et al. 
2008; Montgomery et al. 2015), and health system costs (Vandersteegan et al. 
2015)  
o more equitable access to justice (Bismark et al. 2006a, 2006b) and health care 
(Dubay et al. 2001), and the importance of procedural justice (Siegal et al. 
2008). 
 However, the schemes should not be considered a panacea, as doubts remained as to 
their contribution to patient safety and provider accountability (Wallis 2013).  
What are the implications? 
The CMO configurations generated from the studies contribute to our understanding of 
how compensation schemes can benefit patients and health professionals. Benefits of 
schemes include improved targeting of compensation to those most deserving of it, and 
speedier physical recovery after injury. However, the complexity of the interactions 
between compensation processes, individual circumstances and context-specific health 
systems make it difficult to establish strong potential causal pathways, most notably 
regarding health outcomes. Overall, the shape of compensation schemes will be highly 
influenced by the health system context and the prevailing political opinion about the role 
of the state in health care.  
How did we get these results? 
Papers were sought via iterative searching and included if they focused on compensation 
schemes relevant to iatrogenic injuries occurring at birth or in the early years (under five 
years of age), or sought to compensate injuries in two out of three of the following cases: 
i) resulted high-value claims; ii) had high long-term costs; iii) were highly emotive to 
victims. Papers were assessed for their relevance: the quality of the research reports lies 
in the richness of the descriptions of CMO interactions. Descriptive and empirical data 
were extracted and analysed from individual reports by two reviewers. They met to 
discuss the findings and agree the final set of CMO configurations, and text to justify 
them, as presented. 
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Executive summary  
 
Background  
At present in the UK, compensation for medical injuries can be sought through tort 
litigation, with payouts made through out-of-court settlements or through the courts. No-
fault compensation schemes (NFCSs) provide an alternative, and perhaps more egalitarian 
method to redress claims resulting from medical injury. A range of injury compensation 
schemes have been instituted in other countries for injuries acquired at birth (Farrell et 
al. 2010) or as a result of medical or other non-medical related injuries (Cardoso et al. 
2015). Characteristics common to such schemes include: eligibility and threshold disability 
criteria; financial caps and/or limits to the extent and type of cover provided; levels of 
entitlements; levels of access to justice; restricted court access; and the existence of a 
comprehensive national social welfare/social insurance system (Farrell et al. 2010). 
However, the extent to which the context of compensation affects whether such schemes 
are taken up by affected families is not known. Such contexts include societal factors, the 
health care system, the type of precipitating event, or the characteristics of those who 
institute claims. 
A key policy concern in England is compensation for birth-related trauma. Maternity 
services comprise one of the areas of ‘highest clinical negligence claims’ in terms of both 
number of claims and costs reported to the NHS Litigation Authority (2012 p.4). ‘Between 
2000 and 2009, over 5,000 claims were made totalling £3.1 billion’ (NHS Litigation 
Authority 2012, p.4). This represents less than 0.1% of all births in England during a similar 
period (NHS Litigation Authority 2012). An administrative compensation scheme for birth 
injury does not exist in the UK at present, although there are schemes in place for other 
health issues, such as vaccine-related injury. 
Review aims and approach  
This review was commissioned to inform considerations around the potential to develop an 
administrative compensation scheme for medically acquired birth injury in England. The 
overall aim was to develop preliminary theoretical frameworks of the mechanisms that 
might influence engagement in ‘no-fault type’ compensation schemes and that might 
influence outcomes for affected individuals and families. A realist review was chosen as an 
appropriate method as it is specifically designed for analysing information on varied and 
complex interventions implemented across more than one context and policy area, and 
because a realist approach can be used to explore the suitability of interventions for 
particular circumstances or to refine interventions for different contexts (Rycroft-Malone 
et al. 2012). We employed iterative realist methodology to answer the following research 
questions: 
Review question 1: What individual or contextual factors contribute to people’s reasons 
and motivations for engaging in no-fault type compensation schemes after medical injury? 
(RQ1)  
Review question 2: How are no-fault compensation schemes thought to improve 
outcomes for people with medical injuries? (RQ2)  
Executive summary 
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To fit with a time-restricted policy window this review focused on answering these 
questions by conducting the first part of a realist review: identifying empirically and 
theoretically-based contextual, mechanism and outcome (CMO) configurations. We did not 
test the effectiveness of each CMO configuration proposed (second part of a realist 
review). The review follows the publication standards suggested by the Realist and Meta-
Narrative Evidence Syntheses: Evolving Standards (RAMESES) project (Wong et al., 2013; 
see Appendix 1) and indicates where modifications were made to fit with the short policy 
time-frame (December 2015 to April 2016).  
In relation to the scope, it should also be noted that the review considered papers 
exploring no-fault type schemes, or schemes which provide an alternative to litigation 
based on principles of ‘no-fault’, ‘no-blame’ or ‘avoidable harm’. In addition, although 
this review has been developed with a particular focus on relevance for birth injury, much 
of the evidence identified was drawn from other types of compensation schemes, and 
therefore some of the findings are not directly transferrable to birth injury, although they 
provide helpful insights. 
Methods  
By conducting the first part of a realist review, the aim was to help readers think through 
what possible mechanisms might affect outcomes in the context of NFCSs. We sought to 
develop hypothetical context-mechanism-outcome configurations (CMOs). The text 
describing each CMO configuration is the theoretical and empirical justification for the 
proposed theories, representing a transparent argument based on the literature identified. 
It is important to read the findings with these aims and objectives in mind. We did not aim 
to establish causal relationships between possible mechanisms and outcomes, and so did 
not appraise methodological aspects of study quality. Instead, we assessed the quality of 
the study reports in terms of their contribution to the review’s findings, i.e. the richness 
of descriptions of these interactions.  
We met regularly with the Department of Health (DH) policy leads throughout the review 
process to ensure that the review remained closely aligned with their needs and emerging 
policy requirements. Papers were sought via iterative searching and included if they 
focused on no-fault compensation schemes relevant to iatrogenic injuries in children 
occurring at birth or in the early years (under five years of age), or sought to compensate 
injuries that had at least two of the following characteristics: i) resulted in high-value 
claims; ii) had high long-term costs; or iii) were highly emotive to victims. Empirical and 
descriptive data were extracted from individual studies and were assessed according to 
the way different mechanisms appear to influence outcomes.  
The initial conceptual framework guiding the review was based on the key features of 
NFCSs for medical injury identified in the review by Farrell et al. (2010 pp.8-9). These 
include: eligibility and threshold disability criteria; limitations to the extent of cover; 
levels of entitlements; simpler and more comprehensive access to justice; restricted 
access to courts; and the existence of a comprehensive national social welfare/social 
insurance system. The review began by taking these key features and reading some key 
studies to develop initial hypothetical configurations between) contexts, i.e. different 
types of compensation schemes implemented in different jurisdictions (O’Campo et al. 
2015); mechanisms, e.g. factors potentially contributing to claimant engagement in 
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schemes, or other types of mechanisms triggered by the ways compensation schemes 
might be designed and implemented; and outcomes (e.g. access to justice, health).  
We developed some initial CMOs relating to claimant experience by looking at reviews that 
discussed compensation policies. These CMOs became the initial conceptual framework for 
the study, and we asked the policy team at the DH to prioritise those they would like to 
investigate further. This discussion informed the later searches, where we used the data 
extraction and analysis stage to refine, confirm or refute these configurations. After these 
initial conversations, the team indicated an interest in outcomes for clinicians relating to 
clinical practice, patient safety and clinician well-being. We went through the same 
process of developing crude CMOs to prioritise and narrow our later searches. The stages 
of the CMO development for claimants and clinicians are documented in more detail in 
Part II, the technical report. Descriptive and empirical findings were extracted and 
combined to generate a justification to support the generation of each CMO. Through 
discussions and individual analyses, reviewers focused on refining each CMO to be as 
practically specific as possible. Subsequent analysis of the studies against these CMOs 
aimed to clarify and substantiate our thinking about why we had structured the CMOs in 
this way, acting as a further justification and rationale for the presentation of the final 
configurations.  
Summary of key findings  
There was a lack of evidence directly answering the first review question, on the 
individual or contextual factors potentially contributing to people’s reasons for taking up 
the offer of an NFCS either after birth or other types of medical injury. To answer the 
second review question, we drew on 44 papers to present an overview of proposed 
mechanisms entailed in compensation schemes thought to lead to patient and clinical 
practice outcomes. The majority of papers were empirical studies (n=33). The remaining 
11 papers were policy reviews, which compared different policies across jurisdictions, 
drawing on empirical data, and discussed key variables, such as liability, which became an 
important component of many of the mechanisms. Please note that, as mentioned above, 
the aim of this review was to develop preliminary theoretical frameworks of the 
mechanisms that might influence engagement in NFCSs; the findings should be read in this 
light, and should not be interpreted as definitive evidence that all these mechanisms 
definitely do influence engagement. 
Key features of no-fault compensation schemes identified in the papers  
The components entailed in NFCSs for medical injuries vary across high income countries. 
The main differences focus on the definition of eligibility criteria to determine fault and 
how schemes are funded and organised. An overview of the different approaches to 
compensating people who have experienced a medical injury is provided in Table B.  
 
 
 
 
 
Executive summary 
9 
 
Table B: Overview of compensation schemes for medical injury* 
Key 
components  
United States† 
(since 1990)  
France (since 
2002)  
Nordic countries†† 
(since 1975)  
New Zealand 
(since 2005) 
Eligibility 
criteria for 
compensation 
No-fault:  
Proof that the 
neurological 
birth injury 
occurred as a 
result of the 
birth process  
 
No-fault standard:  
Serious and 
unpredictable 
injuries, without 
relation to their 
previous state of 
health and 
foreseeable 
evolution  
Fault standard:  
Failure to act in 
accordance with 
current scientific 
data or ‘gross or 
intentional 
conduct’  
Avoidability 
standard: 
Injuries could have 
been avoided if the 
care provided had 
been of optimal 
quality 
Unavoidable 
injuries (Denmark): 
Rare and severe 
consequences of 
treatment that 
exceeds what a 
patient should 
‘reasonably be 
expected to endure’ 
Unexpected 
treatment 
injury – for 
those of 
employable 
age  
Continued 
access to 
courts 
No Yes  Yes  No  
How schemes 
are funded  
Annual 
financial 
contribution 
made by 
participating 
doctors and 
hospitals  
No-fault:  
ONIAM (A tax-
based, 
government-
funded 
administrative 
body) 
Fault: 
Providers/insurers 
Patient insurance 
schemes funded by 
a range of public 
and private health 
care providers  
Government 
via tax 
revenue and 
employer 
financial 
premiums  
Financial cap  Yes No  Yes Yes  
Financial 
entitlements 
Economic and 
non-economic 
damages  
Economic and non-
economic damages  
 
Economic and non-
economic damages  
 
Economic 
damages  
 
* Schemes operating in Australia are omitted as they report non-medical compensation schemes 
†Drawing on two no-fault birth injury schemes available in Florida and Virginia  
†† Nordic countries include Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland, with specific details of 
schemes varying across countries  
 
NFCSs specifically for neurological birth injury are in place in two US states: Florida and 
Virginia; other countries operate NFCSs for a range of medical treatments.  
The US-based birth injury schemes insist that, to be eligible, the birth injury has to be 
the result of the birth process and they exclude injuries caused by genetic or congenital 
abnormality. 
France has implemented two systems: a no-fault standard for serious and unforeseen 
medical injuries; and a fault standard, where access to the courts remains fully available. 
The Nordic countries operate an ‘avoidability’ standard, compensating patients who have 
experienced injuries that could have been avoided under optimum conditions, for 
example, where the injury would not have occurred under the care of the best health 
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practitioner/system. Here it is referred to as the ‘experienced specialist’ rule. An 
administrative scheme is in place to provide patients with a non-litigious route to 
compensation. Claimants have the right to appeal a decision made by schemes. They can 
also appeal to the courts if dissatisfied with the outcome of that appeals process and/or 
directly pursue a tort-based claim.   
New Zealand has put in place the broadest eligibility criteria, with a no-fault standard 
applicable to any unexpected treatment injury.  
The only scheme to operate without a financial cap is in France and all but the New 
Zealand schemes aim to cover both economic and non-economic costs.  
Summary of context, mechanisms and outcome configurations  
As stated, our review aimed to develop preliminary theoretical frameworks of the 
mechanisms influencing engagement in NFCSs. Using a realist approach, we sought to 
understand the connections through which different components of such schemes, 
operating under certain social and political systems, are thought to influence patient and 
clinician outcomes. This section presents a summary of our context, mechanism and 
outcomes (CMO) configurations based on our analysis of the papers. The CMOs are 
organised according to four main outcome categories identified in the literature and 
prioritised as of interest to policy leads consulted during this review: 1) access to justice; 
2) clinical practice; 3) patient safety; and 4) patient health.  
We conceptualise context as the jurisdiction of the policies under study and, for this 
reason, have indicated which countries we are discussing in our CMOs. We draw on the 
sociological work of Esping-Andersen (1990) to typify the welfare state context of the 
policies. Therefore, the social democratic nations of Scandinavia appear to favour a 
greater role for the state in providing for their citizens due to their political history of 
social protection. Thus their welfare model explains the development of compensation 
schemes as an extension of that protection. The more liberal states, such as the USA, can 
be seen to favour a more individual response to treatment injury, only stepping in when 
the market fails to provide essential services. This explains the move to cap damages 
when doctors were leaving the profession due to high insurance premiums (Kessler n.d.). 
New Zealand, with one of the most advanced compensation schemes, is also a liberal 
jurisdiction according to Esping-Andersen (1990). This suggests that its welfare model is 
closer to the USA than Sweden and would favour the tort system. However, like Australia, 
it has a strong trade union tradition (Esping-Andersen 1990) and it is notable that its 
compensation system started as a worker compensation programme and continues to 
support only those in employment today. Finally, France represents the conservative state 
(Esping-Andersen 1990), and its compensation programme leaves the majority of claimants 
to pursue redress through the courts, as in the liberal states, but recognises an obligation 
to those in particular need. Therefore, in a spirit of solidarity (Barbot et al. 2014), its 
system compensates those suffering unpredictable injuries and those with severe injury.  
Very few papers relate directly to compensation for birth injury but we have included 
those papers that describe mechanisms relating to medical injury, worker compensation 
and road accident insurance where the notion of no-fault affected outcomes. We argue 
that in our exploration of this mechanism of ‘no-fault’, looking at the broadest range of 
circumstances enables a fuller picture of the possible effects of NFCSs. The mechanisms 
Executive summary 
11 
 
outlined below are derived from the evidence found in the studies we included. We do not 
offer an assessment of the strength of the evidence but aim to describe fully what 
explanations exist for the patterns of effect observed in the literature. This allows policy 
makers to understand the possible implications of such a policy on the introduction of a 
compensation scheme, if it is implemented, but also acknowledges the complexity of the 
political, social, health and legal systems which this policy will operate in and be affected 
by. We make no claims about causal links, since establishing causality was not the aim of 
this review and would possibly be highly challenging in such complex and diverse contexts. 
Access to justice  
Four distinct ‘access to justice’ outcomes were identified in the literature. These 
outcomes focused on: the extent to which schemes are more appealing than accessing the 
court; ensuring equality of access to compensation schemes; processes related to the 
transparency of schemes; and the importance of ensuring that compensation schemes are 
decoupled from disciplinary procedures (see Table C). The 14 papers providing information 
on these outcomes represent six policy contexts cited in this review (the USA, France, the 
Nordic countries, Australia and New Zealand).  
Table C: Access to justice  
Context Mechanisms Access to 
justice 
USA: Early-disclosure 
and resolution 
schemes 
 
France: Fault/no-fault 
schemes 
 
Nordic countries: 
Avoidable standard / 
unavoidable injuries 
Australia: Fault/no-
fault schemes 
 
New Zealand: No 
blame compensation 
schemes 
 
International: Tort 
reform/litigation 
To make compensation schemes attractive to 
claimants, they must offer payment and 
broader eligibility criteria, to ensure schemes 
remain more appealing than the tort-based 
system.   
Justice 1: 
Access to 
courts 
NFCSs that are free to access improve justice 
outcomes in that they are accessible to all 
eligible parties, unlike the tort system, which 
may favour those who can afford legal 
representation (in certain jurisdictions). 
Justice 2: 
Equality of 
access 
Transparency of process achieves justice 
through the representation of the claimant, and 
mechanisms that improve the consistency of 
decision making through the use of medical 
experts and the consideration of precedents. 
Justice 3: 
Transparency 
of process 
Creating a ‘Chinese wall’ between 
compensation procedures and disciplinary 
procedures enables improved access to justice 
and a more efficient compensation scheme, 
since physicians are more ready to hand over 
the relevant information. 
Justice 4: 
Compensation 
decoupled from 
disciplinary 
procedures 
 
Clinical practice  
This section explores the mechanisms under which tort reform and no-fault compensations 
schemes are thought to lead to improvements in clinical practice outcomes (see Table D). 
Of the 14 relevant papers, the majority draw on the medical-legal context in the USA 
(n=9); further studies add to our theoretical understanding by drawing on wider 
international contexts of compensation schemes and tort reform (n=5).  
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Table D: Clinical practice outcomes  
Context Mechanisms Clinical practice 
outcomes 
USA: Tort reform / 
litigation only 
 
International: No-fault 
schemes/litigation  
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary 
tests and procedures and improve access to 
health care for patients considered 
‘riskier’ by clinicians, because doctors are 
less likely to practise positive and/or 
negative defensive medicine to protect 
themselves from litigation.  
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine 
 
 
Patient safety  
The conditions under which patient safety can be improved as a result of tort reform 
and/or the introduction of NFCSs are drawn from 10 papers. The two key outcomes 
identified in the literature focus on how different mechanisms can support clinicians to 
more readily admit to errors and the extent to which mechanisms can be put in place to 
enable learning from those errors (see Table E). Just over half of the papers reflect on the 
introduction of an NFCS in New Zealand (n=4) or schemes currently available in the Nordic 
countries (n=2).  
Table E: Patient safety outcomes  
Context Mechanisms Patient 
safety 
outcomes 
USA: Early-disclosure 
and resolution schemes 
 
Nordic countries: 
Avoidable standard / 
unavoidable injuries 
 
New Zealand: No-blame 
compensation schemes 
 
USA: Tort reform / 
litigation only 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling 
physicians to disclose iatrogenic injury 
through the removal of personal liability, 
applying the avoidability criterion and 
decoupling compensation from disciplinary 
procedures. 
Patient 
safety 1:  
Admitting to 
error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling the 
pooling and sharing of information about 
medical errors and by reframing the 
compensation process as a patient safety 
strategy rather than a risk management 
strategy. 
Patient 
safety 2: 
Learning 
from error 
 
Health outcomes  
All of the studies (n=8) associated with health outcomes are concerned with compensation 
relating to accidents, mostly road traffic; with none related to iatrogenic injury (see Table 
F). Some are concerned with accidents at work and are covered by worker compensation 
schemes. Most of these studies were conducted in Australia (n=6).  
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Table F: Patient health outcomes  
Context Mechanisms Health outcomes 
Australia: Fault/no-
fault schemes 
 
New Zealand: No-
blame compensation 
schemes 
 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the physical 
health of patients by shortening the length of 
time to claim closure and by including a 
rehabilitative element in the award.  
Health 1:  
Physical health 
 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the mental 
health of patients by shortening the length of 
time to claim closure and by removing the 
adversarial element of the tort system. 
Health 2:  
Mental health 
 
 
Key mechanisms influencing outcomes  
We found few papers that directly answered our research question about the factors that 
affected take-up of these schemes by patients affected by medical injury. However, our 
exploration of the mechanisms associated with no-fault schemes gives us some information 
about the possible motivations of patients and clinicians to engage with such schemes. So 
in answering question two, we have provided some understanding about question one.  
Overall, we found varied conceptions of the notion of NFCSs. We also identified and 
included papers that discussed the effects of tort reform when those effects were 
comparable to no-fault schemes, for example, where the effect of reduced malpractice 
pressure on doctors and the subsequent impact on defensive medicine were similar to 
mechanism in no-fault schemes of the decoupling of compensation and disciplinary 
procedures (Vandersteegen et al. 2015).  
Liability was the key variable in the schemes and the concept of blame across different 
jurisdictions shaped the schemes profoundly. In France, the compensation scheme was an 
expression of solidarity with individuals who had suffered major injury (Barbot et al. 
2014), but they retained the notion of blame and the litigation process for those patients 
who could establish liability. In New Zealand, the country that most clearly dispensed with 
blame, the scheme operated like a targeted social security benefit programme, with its 
broad eligibility criterion of ‘treatment injury’ (Kachalia et al. 2008), but only for those in 
employment. In the United States, tort reform seemed to be the reluctant consequence of 
a breakdown in the compensation system when doctors could no longer afford the 
insurance premiums and were leaving the profession (Kessler n.d.). These reforms seemed 
highly contested, with studies competing to show that the reforms had large or no effects. 
This research may reflect an anxiety about reducing the accountability of the medical 
profession, and restricting access to legal redress.  
Evidently, the schemes were a product of their jurisdictions. In New Zealand and 
Scandinavia, with their universal health-care provision, the creation of a state-run 
compensation scheme fitted with their conception of health care as an important provision 
by central government. In the United States, there was understandable reluctance to deny 
claimants the possibility of attaining damages through the court process, since there was 
less of a social security safety net to support individuals with ongoing ill health and 
disability.  
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Authors were critical of the tort system and its role in the compensation process. They 
described it as imprecise, since some undeserving claimants were successful, and many 
deserving cases were unsuccessful. In some non-UK contexts, they argued that the tort 
system was unfair, favouring those who could afford to pay for expensive lawyers and 
discriminating against the poor.  
There were assertions of damaging effects on claimants, on their physical and mental 
health (e.g. Grant et al. 2014, Sterling et al. 2010), and on their incomes. The tort system 
could lead to distress for doctors and nurses, causing early exits from the profession, long-
term sick leave (Robertson and Thomson 2014) and claims by doctors in the UK of a 
greater likelihood of practising defensive medicine (Bourne et al. 2015). There were 
examples of costs to the health system as a whole, particularly in the defensive practices 
of over-ordering tests and conservative treatments as clinicians sought to protect 
themselves against malpractice suits. Further, negative defensive medicine (e.g. 
restricting or denying care or treatment to patients considered too ‘riskier’ by clinicians) 
could contribute to inequalities in health systems.  
The empirical research attempted to test out the effect of no-fault schemes and tort 
reform on these issues. This research alongside more theoretical contributions, enabled 
the development of propositions which explained the observed effects of no-fault schemes 
and tort reform when they were compared to the tort system. These explanations gave 
reasons for: the more precise targeting of compensation for intended beneficiaries (Davis 
et al. 2002); the impacts on physical and mental health outcomes (Cameron et al. 2008; 
Montgomery et al. 2015), and health system costs (Vandersteegan et al. 2015); the more 
equitable access to justice (Bismark et al. 2006a, 2006b) and health care (Dubay et al. 
2001); the importance of procedural justice (Siegal et al. 2008); the possibilities of 
improved patient safety (Wallis 2013); and the limited information on medical error 
(Wallis 2015).  
There was a lack of studies regarding the physical and mental health impacts of no-fault 
schemes where the claimants had suffered an injury as a result of medical treatment. The 
mental health detriment suffered by those experiencing injury through medical error may 
be greater than those injured in car accidents, since iatrogenic injury may represent a 
breakdown in trust not experienced by car accident victims.  
Strengths and limitations  
The process we adopted aimed to focus on the needs of policy makers as they considered 
different policy options, and allowed for iteration as researchers and policy makers 
considered the most relevant issues for exploration. Using this process, we developed our 
CMO configurations in consultation with the policy team at DH.  
As in all realist reviews, we relied on snowballing techniques to identify relevant 
literature, picking up terms in papers as we read them in order to use them in further 
searches, as well as mining papers for citations and searching for papers that cited 
included studies. In this respect, the process of identifying the studies to include in the 
review is not entirely replicable. We only included studies that provided new explanations 
and discarded those that repeated explanations. These papers would be included if a more 
in-depth review was commissioned to test our CMO propositions.  
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Throughout the review, the team has engaged in discussions about the included papers in 
order to refine the CMOs and to check our understanding of the arguments, results and 
conclusions of the papers. Two researchers carried out data extraction on the included 
studies and met to discuss the clarification of the initial CMO, the structuring of the 
evidence and the contribution of each of the papers. In line with a realist approach 
(O’Campo et al. 2015), we have assessed the studies according to their relevance and the 
richness of their descriptions regarding the effects of no-fault schemes or tort reform on 
the lives of claimants and doctors. This was an appropriate approach in this review, as we 
were not using the papers to determine cause and effect, but to identify the range of 
possible mechanisms that might influence engagement in NFCSs. The papers are not 
directly comparable since some are empirical studies, some are policy reviews and one 
uses economic modelling. However, we did not include opinion pieces, commentaries or 
editorials, as we found the most useful studies to be those with some evidential basis.  
Implications  
This group of studies:  
Can contribute to our understanding of how ‘no-fault’ compensation schemes can benefit 
key stakeholders, namely patients, health professionals and the health system as a whole. 
The range of benefits, discussed by the studies, include improved targeting of 
compensation to those most deserving of it, and speedier physical recovery after injury. 
However, the complexity of the interactions between compensation processes, individual 
circumstances and the health systems in which the schemes are embedded, make it 
difficult to establish strong possible causal pathways, most notably regarding health 
outcomes.  
The shape of the schemes will be highly influenced by the health system context, which, 
in turn, is affected by the prevailing political opinion about the role of the state in health 
care.  
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Part 1: Background, brief methods, findings and implications  
1. Background 
1.1 Description of the problem  
At present in the UK, compensation for medical injuries can be sought through the tort 
system, where patients or their families attempt to claim compensation through litigation. 
Financial payouts may be made through out-of-court settlements or through the courts. 
No-fault compensation schemes (NFCSs) could provide an alternative, and perhaps more 
egalitarian method to redress claims resulting from medical injury (Farrell et al. 2010). In 
other countries, a range of birth and non-birth medical injury compensation schemes have 
been instituted (Cardoso et al. 2015; Farrell et al. 2010). Characteristics common to such 
schemes include: eligibility and threshold disability criteria, financial caps and/or limits to 
the extent and type of cover provided; differing levels of entitlements; levels of access to 
justice; restricted court access; and the existence of a comprehensive national social 
welfare/social insurance system (Farrell et al. 2010).  
Currently, an administrative compensation scheme for birth trauma does not exist in the 
UK. However, several compensation schemes for other health issues are in place. Some of 
these may share circumstances with some similarity to those in which birth trauma occurs 
(i.e. occurring in early life), for example, vaccine-related injury, variant Creutzfeld-Jakob 
Disease (vCJD), thalidomide poisoning or contaminated blood transfusions, while others 
are less similar, such as traffic related injuries, workplace asbestos-related injury, violent 
crime.  
The extent to which the context of compensation affects whether such schemes are taken 
up by affected families is not known; such factors include the wider socio-legal and health 
care system, the type of precipitating event and the characteristics of those who institute 
claims. It is argued that, in general, compensation schemes have the advantages of 
greater access to justice via financial reward, improved efficiency in time and costs, 
improved patient-provider relationships and reduced numbers of legal actions. However, 
these may come at a cost, including lower entitlements, a significant rate of application 
rejection, and a potential reduction in the quality of health professional care and 
institutional accountability (Farrell et al. 2010). This suggests that the uptake of NFCSs 
could be influenced by multiple social and individual factors. 
1.2 UK policy context  
The number and value of litigious claims for medical injury compensation lodged against 
the National Health Service (NHS) has been rising substantially in recent years (Thomas 
2015). Maternity services comprise one of the areas of ‘highest clinical negligence claims’ 
in terms of both number of claims and costs reported to the NHS Litigation Authority 
(NHSLA) (2012 p.4). This may be due in part to the fact that injuries resulting from birth 
trauma can impact significantly on the morbidity of newborn infants (Lain et al. 2012, 
Perez et al. 2013). ‘Between 2000 and 2009, over 5,000 claims were made totalling £3.1 
1. Background 
17 
 
billion’ (NHSLA 2012 p.4). This represents less than 0.1% of all births in England during a 
similar period. 
A review of the NHSLA, which manages litigation on behalf of the English NHS, noted that 
there was ‘a need to rethink the approach to reducing the incidence and cost of claims to 
the NHS’ (Thomas 2015 p.5). As the Chair wrote, ‘the environment in which we operate 
means that the costs of litigation are placing a burden on NHS finances of a magnitude 
that was never imagined when the NHS LA was established [in 1995]’ (NHS Litigation 
Authority 2015 p.4).  
Aside from the large and increasing cost to the NHS, other disadvantages of the current 
compensation system include the time taken to resolve claims (Farrell et al. 2010), limited 
access to justice for the most vulnerable through the abolition of most legal aid (Dyer, 
2013), the fact that a substantial proportion of money paid out goes to the legal 
profession rather than the victims, and the disproportionate, excessive and increasing 
claimant costs for lower-value claims (NHS Litigation Authority 2015). 
Consideration of an NFCS is not novel: it was first considered in Scotland, but rejected, in 
1978, when critics feared that it would encourage more claims and so increase costs (Dyer 
2012). An administrative compensation scheme  was also raised as a possibility in the 
Making Amends report (Department of Health 2003), which suggested that a no-fault 
compensation could be made available for babies who were severely neurologically 
impaired during birth, but was subsequently dropped. In 2011, the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on Health rejected similar proposals , citing costs and a concern that it would 
reduce the level of compensation for those most in need. 
In Scotland, an expert group was convened in 2009 to consider the possibilities of a non-
fault compensation for medical injury but not specifically related to birth. They 
recommended the adoption of a scheme based on the Swedish model (McClean, 2011); a 
consultation on their proposal was held in 2012, with the government’s response published 
in 2014. Further consultation is also in progress on an avoidable harm scheme for lower 
value medical injury claims (Scottish Government 2014). 
1.3 Review aims and approach  
This rapid realist review builds on existing research activity which has primarily focused on 
identifying and describing existing fault and NFCSs in the international literature (e.g. 
Farrell et al. 2010). However, there is a lack of evidence analysing the individual and 
contextual factors contributing to the process of engaging with compensation schemes, an 
identification of the circumstances that could support uptake or an understanding of the 
pathway from contextual mechanisms to different types of outcomes.  
The overall aim of this review is to fill that gap by developing a preliminary theoretical 
framework of the mechanisms entailed within the structure of a compensation scheme 
that could influence engagement in NFCSs or schemes that are equivalent in size and 
scale. This theoretical framework also aimed to describe the context and mechanisms that 
might lead to improvements in outcomes for affected patients. We sought to achieve 
these aims by seeking evidence to address the following research questions:  
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Review question 1: What individual or contextual factors contribute to people’s reasons 
and motivations for engaging in no-fault type compensation schemes after medical injury? 
(RQ1)  
Review question 2: How are no-fault compensation schemes thought to improve 
outcomes for people with medical injuries? (RQ2)  
A realist review was chosen as an appropriate method as it is specifically designed for 
analysing information on varied and complex interventions implemented across more than 
one context and policy area and because a realist approach can be used to explore the 
suitability of interventions for particular circumstances or to refine interventions for 
different contexts (Rycroft-Malone et al. 2012). To fit with a time-restricted policy 
window, this review focused on answering these questions by conducting the first part of a 
realist review: identifying empirically and theoretically-based contextual, mechanisms and 
outcome (CMO) configurations. We did not test the effectiveness of each CMO 
configuration proposed (second part of a realist review). The review follows the 
publication standards suggested by the Realist and Meta-Narrative Evidence Syntheses: 
Evolving Standards (RAMESES) project (Wong et al., 2013; see Appendix 1) and indicates 
where modifications were made to fit with the short policy time-frame (December 2015 to 
April 2016).  
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2. Brief methods  
This chapter provides a brief overview of the methods used to conduct the review in order 
to facilitate readability for those more concerned with the overview of the context, 
mechanisms and outcome configurations and the text provided to justify them. A fuller 
description of the methods is provided in Part II of this report. 
2.1 Type of review and user involvement  
As stated, to fit within this time-frame this review focused solely on the first part of a 
realist review: identifying empirically and theoretically-based contextual, mechanism and 
outcome (CMO) configurations. This review was conducted iteratively through: 1) initial 
searching and definition of the scope of the review; 2) further searching and iterative 
screening of primary studies; 3) assessment of relevance and data extraction of studies; 
and 4) developing an evidence-informed preliminary theoretical framework in the form of 
CMO configurations (Rycroft-Malone et al. 2012; Saul et al. 2013). We met regularly with 
the DH policy leads throughout the review process to ensure that the review was closely 
aligned with their needs and emerging policy requirements. 
2.2 Conceptual framework and preliminary CMO framework  
The initial conceptual framework guiding the review was based on the key features of 
NFCSs for medical injury identified in the review by Farrell et al. (2010 pp.8-9) and were 
expressed in the protocol:  
It is argued that, in general, compensation schemes have the advantages of greater access 
to justice, improved efficiency in time and costs, as well as in patient-provider 
relationships, and reduced legal actions; however these may come at a cost, including 
lower entitlements, a significant rate of application rejection, and a potential reduction in 
the quality of health professional care and institutional accountability (Farrell et al. 2010) 
This statement formed the starting point for the investigation into the compensation 
schemes. During the protocol development, we began by reading some key studies to 
develop initial hypothetical configurations between contexts, mechanisms and outcomes. 
We defined and understood context to consist of the compensation schemes for injuries 
occurring during birth and early childhood or in other medical injuries, as they are played 
out in Western welfare states. Mechanisms included the factors contributing to claimant 
motivation to engage with compensation schemes as well as aspects of the design of the 
schemes that might trigger greater engagement.  
We developed some initial CMOs relating to claimant experience by looking at reviews that 
discussed compensation policies. These CMOs became the initial conceptual framework for 
the study, and we asked the policy team at the DH to prioritise those they would like to 
investigate further. This discussion informed the later searches, where we used the data 
extraction and analysis stage to refine, confirm or refute these configurations. After these 
initial conversations, the team indicated an interest in outcomes for clinicians relating to 
clinical practice, patient safety and clinician well-being. We went through the same 
process of developing crude CMOs to prioritise and narrow our later searches. The stages 
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of the CMO development for claimants and clinicians are documented in more detail in 
Part II, the technical report. 
2.3 Identification and selection of papers to inform the CMO configurations  
To be eligible for inclusion in this review, papers needed to focus on a no-fault type 
compensation scheme or tort reform3, relevant to potentially iatrogenic injuries in 
children occurring at birth or in the early years (under five), or which have two of the 
three characteristics similar to birth trauma compensation schemes: high-value claims; 
high long-term costs; highly emotive. They needed to examine contextual factors 
influencing the delivery mechanisms of schemes and/or contribute to our understanding of 
CMOs, i.e., contain information about the effects of compensation schemes on patient and 
clinical outcomes. Initially we looked for papers published within the past ten years. This 
timescale identified literature most relevant to the UK context since the introduction of 
both the Making Amends report and the NHS Redress Act 2006, both of which dealt with 
medical liability reform (Department of Health 2003; UK Parliament 2006). However, we 
included papers outside that timeframe when they contained pertinent information, such 
as Dubay et al. (2001).  
2.4 Data extraction and relevance appraisal  
Descriptive characteristics were extracted from the studies, specifically, what type of 
NFCS and country the study investigated, and whether the focus of injury was medically 
caused or not. Further empirical and descriptive information from the studies was 
extracted, drawing on the initial conceptual framework with newly identified concepts 
added to this framework as they appeared in the literature (see Appendix 2 for the coding 
tool). We also developed criteria specifically to assess the relevance of papers to answer 
the review questions. First, we made an assessment of whether the paper aimed to 
investigate, explore or describe the implementation or introduction of NFCS for birth 
injury, medical injury or other types of injuries. Second, we assessed whether the paper 
provided information or empirical evidence on uptake or on any one of the CMOs, e.g., 
whether there was sufficient explanation of why compensation schemes, or their different 
mechanisms, led to a particular outcome. Based on answers to these questions, an overall 
judgement of high, medium or low relevance was made. Overall, evidence was considered 
to be of low relevance when the focus was not medically related or when speculations 
from the authors were unsupported by empirical evidence from the study they were 
reporting on.  
2.5 Developing the CMO framework and appraisal of relevance  
Empirical and descriptive data from studies on how different factors appear to affect 
uptake and engagement in NFCSs and the manner in which they operate (mechanisms) 
were combined from individual studies (Oliver et al. 2008; Thomas et al. 2012). Our initial 
work focused on refining the CMOs so that they were as practically specific as possible. 
This was made possible through reflective discussion between two reviewers (KD and KH) 
to consider the data extracted, whether they supported the CMOs and where refinements 
needed to be made. The analysis of the studies against these CMOs aimed to clarify and 
                                            
3  Tort reform refers to a set of proposed changes in the legal justice system focusing on the extent to which 
individuals can claim for damages as a result of medical or non-medical injuries 
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substantiate our thinking about why we had structured the CMOs in this way. Thus the 
syntheses justified the configurations as they are presented in the report. At the study 
selection stage, reviewers discussed in detail a sub-set of papers potentially relevant to 
informing the CMO framework in terms of their richness, depth and level of empiricism. All 
papers were checked by a second reviewer to confirm they met the inclusion criteria for 
relevance.  
 
3. Findings 
22 
 
3. Findings  
As stated, our review aimed to develop a preliminary framework of the mechanisms 
influencing engagement in NFCSs. Using a realist approach, we sought to understand the 
connections through which different components of NFCSs, which operate under certain 
social and political systems, are thought to influence patient and clinician outcomes. This 
section outlines our context, mechanism and outcomes (CMO) framework based on our 
review of the papers. It is organised according to the four main outcome categories 
identified in the literature and prioritised as of interest to policy (Section 3.3). 
The text in bold, under each outcome, is the CMO configuration, and is written in the form 
of a proposition or a hypothesis. This configuration was developed from the literature, 
acting as a summary and a distillation of the text following it. In turn, the text acted as a 
justification for the wording of the proposition. This enabled us to be transparent in the 
presentation of the arguments for compensation schemes found in the literature. We 
searched for papers that challenged the propositions, and where we found them, we 
included them in the text. We assessed these papers for relevance, thus, the review 
makes no claims about causal links, as this was not its aim (and might be highly 
challenging in such complex and diverse contexts). 
Further, it is important to reiterate that very few papers related directly to compensation 
for birth injury. However, we have included those papers that describe mechanisms 
relating to medical injury, worker compensation and road accident insurance where the 
notion of no-fault affected outcomes. We argue that looking at the broadest range of 
circumstances enables a fuller picture of the effects of no-fault schemes.  
3.1 Evidence informing the CMO framework  
We found few papers providing qualitative evidence to directly answer our research 
question about the contextual factors that might influence and affect the uptake of NFCSs 
for patients affected by medical injury (RQ1). However, our exploration of the 
mechanisms associated with no-fault schemes (RQ2) gives us some information about the 
possible motivations of patients and clinicians to engage with such schemes, providing 
some understanding about question one. To answer the second review question, relating 
to the proposed mechanisms in NFCSs thought to lead to patient and clinical practice 
outcomes, we draw from 44 papers, the majority of which are empirical studies (n=33) or 
policy reviews drawing on empirical data (N=11). The papers provided evidence on a range 
of social contexts in which fault-based and NFCSs operated (Table 3.1). Further details of 
the characteristics of papers can be found in Appendix 3.  
3.2 Key features of no-fault compensation schemes  
The components entailed in NFCSs for medical injuries vary across high-income countries. 
The main differences focus on the definition of eligibility criteria to determine fault and 
how schemes are funded and organised. An overview of the different approaches to 
compensating people who have experienced a medical injury is provided in the table 
below.  
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Table 3.1: Overview of medical no-fault compensation schemes*  
Key 
components  
United State† 
(since 1990)  
France (since 
2002)  
Nordic countries†† 
(since 1975)  
New Zealand 
(since 2005) 
Eligibility 
criteria for 
compensation 
No-fault:  
Proof that the 
neurological 
birth injury 
occurred as a 
result of the 
birth process  
 
No-fault standard:  
Serious and 
unpredictable 
injuries, without 
relation to their 
previous state of 
health and 
foreseeable 
evolution  
Fault standard:  
Failure to act in 
accordance with 
current scientific 
data or ‘gross or 
intentional 
conduct’  
Avoidability 
standard: 
Injuries could have 
been avoided if the 
care provided had 
been of optimal 
quality 
Unavoidable injuries 
(Denmark): 
Rare and severe 
consequences of 
treatment that 
exceeds what a 
patient should 
‘reasonably be 
expected to endure’ 
Unexpected 
treatment 
injury – for 
those of 
employable age  
Continued 
access to 
courts 
No Yes  Yes  No  
How schemes 
are funded  
Annual 
financial 
contribution 
made by 
participating 
doctors and 
hospitals  
No-fault:  
ONIAM (A tax-
based, government-
funded 
administrative 
body) 
Fault: 
Providers/insurers 
Patient insurance 
schemes funded by a 
range of public and 
private health care 
providers  
Government 
via tax revenue 
and employer 
financial 
premiums  
Financial cap  Yes No  Yes Yes  
Financial 
entitlements 
Economic and 
non-economic 
damages  
Economic and non-
economic damages  
 
Economic and non-
economic damages  
 
Economic 
damages  
 
* Schemes operating in Australia are omitted as they report non-medical compensation schemes 
†Drawing on two no-fault birth injury schemes available in Florida and Virginia  
†† Nordic countries include Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland, with specific details of 
schemes varying across countries.  
 
NFCSs specifically for neurological birth injury are in place in two US states: Florida and 
Virginia; other countries operate NFCSs for a range of medical treatments. The US-based 
birth injury schemes insist that, to be eligible, the birth injury has to be the result of the 
birth process, and they exclude injuries caused by genetic or congenital abnormality. 
France has implemented two systems: a no-fault standard for serious and unforeseen 
medical injuries; and a fault standard, where access to the courts remains for those 
putting in an initial claim.  
The Nordic countries operate an ‘avoidability’ standard, compensating patients who have 
experienced injuries that could have been avoided under optimum conditions, for 
example, where the injury would not have occurred under the care of the best health 
practitioner/system. Here it is referred to as the ‘experienced specialist’ rule. An 
administrative scheme is in place to provide patients with a non-litigious route to 
compensation. Claimants have the right to appeal a decision made by schemes. They can 
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also appeal to the courts if dissatisfied with the outcome of that appeals process and/or 
directly pursue a tort-based claim.   
New Zealand has put in place the broadest eligibility criteria, with a no-fault standard 
applicable to any unexpected treatment injury. The only scheme to operate without a 
financial cap is in France and all but the New Zealand schemes aim to cover both 
economic and non-economic costs.  
3.3 Context, mechanisms and outcome configurations: preliminary theoretical 
frameworks  
3.3.1 Access to justice  
Four distinct ‘access to justice’ outcomes were identified in the literature. These 
outcomes focused on: the extent to which schemes are more appealing than accessing the 
courts; ensuring equality of access to compensation schemes; processes related to the 
transparency of schemes; and the importance of ensuring that compensation schemes are 
decoupled from disciplinary procedures (see Figure 3.1). The 14 papers providing 
information on these outcomes represent six policy contexts cited in this review (the USA, 
France, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand).  
Figure 3.1: Access to justice  
 
 
3.3.1.1 Justice 1: Access to courts 
To make compensation schemes attractive to claimants, they must offer payments 
comparable to damages awarded through litigation and include broader eligibility 
criteria, to ensure that schemes remain more appealing than the tort-based system.  
The schemes differ in the extent to which claimants can access the court system. In 
Scandinavia and New Zealand, claimants may appeal the decision of ineligibility made by 
claim assessors and, if unsuccessful at this first appeal stage, can take their case to the 
courts (Kachalia et al. 2008). In Virginia and Florida, claimants are restricted in their 
access to court by the sign-up of the provider to the compensation scheme. If a provider 
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subscribes to the scheme, then the claimant does not have access to court and must claim 
through the scheme. If the provider is not part of the scheme, then they can pursue their 
claim through the courts. In Florida, where there is extensive sign-up to the compensation 
scheme, there are many disputes about the notice about compensation provision given to 
patients as they take up care, since this forecloses choice about litigation. In Virginia, 
where fewer providers have signed up, there are more choices for patients regarding 
provision, either with those who are covered or those who are not (Siegal et al. 2008). In 
France, the compensation scheme only covers those with severe injuries incurred as a 
medical mishap. If fault can be established, then the claimant must pursue this in court 
(Barbot et al. 2014).  
Broader eligibility  
Only France insists on establishing the personal liability of providers. If this is achieved, 
then the claimant has access to the courts. All the other schemes do not seek to establish 
the personal negligence or liability of the provider. 
In Virginia and Florida, the claimant has to establish causation as a result of the birth 
process. This can be difficult in cases of cerebral palsy, so the compensation process 
usually gives claimants the benefit of the doubt. In this way, the compensation process 
broadens the eligibility criteria by accepting cases that would not be accepted by the 
courts (Siegal et al. 2008). This makes the administrative compensation process more 
attractive to claimants in a system where there is greater expectation of a litigation 
process to resolve disputes.  
Fewer claims to the compensation scheme are made in France, attributable to the higher 
eligibility threshold that needs to be met for acceptance into its scheme. Barbot et al. 
(2014) found that access to courts remains an appealing option to claimants because of 
this ‘relatively high level of injury gravity required’ to access the NFCS and ‘the 
maintenance of a fault standard’ which may contribute to providers being reluctant to 
facilitate claims’ (Barbot et al. 2014 p.241).  
Kachalia et al. (2008) provide an overview of the criteria for compensability of medical 
injury in three countries (Denmark, Sweden, New Zealand), in order to compare them to 
the tort system in the US. They discuss the avoidability criterion in Scandinavia as an 
example of the administrative schemes broadening out the eligibility criteria. The 
avoidability standard has a lower threshold than the negligence standard, commonly used 
by the tort system, so a greater number of claims can be made in the administrative 
scheme than would be accepted in court. It introduces the idea of judging provision 
against the best possible care available at the time of the incident, in terms of specialist 
physicians, treatment and drug choice. In Denmark, they adjudicate more strictly than in 
Sweden, but to balance this, have added an endurability criterion which is compensation 
for catastrophic injuries. These injuries result in disabilities of such severity that exceed a 
level which patients could be reasonably expected to endure, whether the injury is 
avoidable or not. This is more widely applied than the one allowed in Sweden for hospital-
acquired infections (Kachalia et al. 2008).  
New Zealand has the broadest eligibility criteria, with compensation claimable for any 
injury caused by medical treatment (since 2005) and is perhaps the truest ‘no-fault’ 
system. It is limited by the requirement that the injury is caused by active treatment, so 
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it does not cover injury caused by omission, such as late diagnosis. It also covers loss of 
wages and is only open to those of employable age. 
Capping damages  
In compensation processes, damages can cover both economic losses and non-economic 
costs, usually referred to as ‘pain and suffering’. New Zealand limits payments to 
economic costs, most importantly lost wages as a result of the injury. It does not pay non-
economic damages, but schemes in other countries do make a one-off payment for this 
(Kachalia et al. 2008).  
Aside from France, the majority of NFCSs operate a financial cap. Figures for average 
payouts in European countries are reported in Barbot et al. (2008 p.241), with the highest 
in France (US$ 102,000) compared to other countries, such New Zealand (US$ 12,500), 
Sweden (US$ 22,000) or Denmark (US$ 30,000).  
In Florida and Virginia, a total cap on damages awarded via the courts was introduced to 
encourage usage of birth injury compensation programmes. The Virginia birth injury 
programme first adopted the cap in 1992, ensuring that the amount payable was similar to 
what would be available through their programme. However, Florida did not put a cap in 
place until 2003, after finding that many attorneys were encouraging claimants to go 
through the courts, believing that they would be awarded higher damages (Siegal et al. 
2008 p.496). The caps in the US are set at a much higher amount (US$ 750,000), since the 
universal health care available in the other countries is expected to provide an ongoing 
safety net (Kachalia et al. 2008) not available in the US.  
3.3.1.2 Justice 2: Equality of access 
NFCSs that are free to access improve justice outcomes in that they are accessible to 
all eligible parties, unlike the tort system, which favours those who can afford legal 
representation.  
All the ‘no-fault’ schemes are free to eligible parties. In Scandinavia, claimants can access 
the system without physician support, but in New Zealand, a doctor makes the claim on 
behalf of the claimant (Kachalia et al. 2008). In the US schemes, some claimants choose to 
use legal representation to make claims, although it is not necessary, which inevitably 
increases the expense to the claimant (Siegal et al. 2008).  
Davis et al. (2002) and Bismark et al. (2006a) conducted empirical studies to examine the 
level of claiming in the New Zealand scheme, and Armstrong and Tess (2008) later used 
the Davis study data in their review of no-fault schemes to make a comparison with the 
fault system. Davis et al. (2002) used data from 1995 hospital admissions to decide which 
injuries would be compensable, and then looked at ACC (Accident Compensation 
Corporation) records to find out if claims had been made and whether they were 
successful. They found that roughly 1 in 30 potentially compensable claims were made, 
but of those claims made, 60% succeeded. They concluded that the scheme was well–
targeted, in that the claims made were compensable. However, there was pervasive 
under-claiming. Likewise, Bismark et al. (2006a) found that the vast majority of eligible 
patients (97%) did not claim. The risk factors for not claiming are discussed below. 
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Armstrong and Tess (2008) compared success rates in the fault system in the USA – only 8% 
of those injured in the medical system received any compensation – with those in the no-
fault system, and concluded that the number of claimants was low in both circumstances. 
In their discussion, Bismark et al. (2006a) mentioned that the proportion claiming was 
close to that estimated in tort systems in New York in the late 1980s and Utah and 
Colorado in the late 1990s. So we can conclude that under-claiming is common to both the 
administrative compensation schemes and the tort system. 
However, the figures from Davis et al. (2002) and Bismark et al. (2006a) are out of date, 
since the New Zealand scheme changed in 2005 to remove the notion of ‘fault’ and to 
move to the eligibility criterion of ‘treatment injury’. This has considerably broadened the 
scope for compensation, and Bismark et al. (2006a) conclude that the claim rate will climb 
as a result. 
Patterns of claiming 
Some papers have described the profile of claimants and non-claimants in order to 
understand patterns of inequality that may exist. These studies have considered the New 
Zealand scheme (Bismark et al. 2006a; Davis et al. 2002; Sobrun Maharaj et al. 2010), the 
Finnish scheme (Jarvelin et al. 2012) and the schemes in Florida and Virginia (Siegal et al. 
2008). Bismark et al. (2006a) and Siegal et al. (2008) considered aspects of the schemes 
themselves that may create inequalities.  
Individual characteristics: claimants 
Claimants were generally people of working age (Bismark et al. 2006a; Jarvelin et al. 
2012), female (Davis et al. 2002), those with co-morbidity (Jarvelin et al. 2012) and those 
who suffered permanent disability (Bismark et al. 2006a). In their study of patients 
undergoing knee and hip operations, Jarvelin et al. (2012) also found that the type of 
prosthesis predicted claims. Further, hospitals with low volumes of this kind of procedure 
were more likely to attract claims.  
The economic advantages to those of working age were apparent in the New Zealand 
scheme, as only economic damages are paid, usually loss of wages, without a one-off 
payment for pain and suffering as in other schemes, such as in Scandinavia and the US. 
Additionally, their need may be greater, as this group often must provide for dependants 
(Bismark et al. 2006a).  
Davis et al. (2002) explained that the finding that higher numbers of women claim, was a 
result of surgical procedures in obstetrics and gynaecology. They suggested that causation 
was easier to establish in the case of surgery than in more general hospital care.  
The explanation for higher rates of claiming amongst those with co-morbidity pointed to 
patients who were well acquainted with the health system and often with a level of 
dissatisfaction with their care (Jarvelin et al. 2012). However, this finding was not 
statistically significant. 
The finding concerning permanent disability was accounted for by high need leading to a 
clear advantage to claim, and the claims being usually compensable (Bismark et al. 
2006a). 
Individual characteristics: non-claimants  
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The missing populations from the claiming group were older people (˃ 65 years) (Bismark 
et al. 2006a; Jarvelin et al. 2012); ethnic minorities (Bismark et al. 2006b; Sobrun-Maharaj 
et al. 2010); the socially deprived (Bismark et al. 2006b); and those suffering temporary 
disability or the death of a family member (Bismark et al. 2006b).  
For older people, there appeared to be few benefits to claiming in New Zealand, as 
payment was calculated on loss of earnings. Medical costs are paid for in New Zealand 
without claiming, so reducing the need to claim for this group. Conversely, there were 
much higher claims in dental cases for this group. These injuries were likely to involve 
out-of-pocket expenses, as dental care is not covered by the state’s social security system 
(Bismark et al. 2006b). Likewise, Jarvelin et al. (2012) concluded that there were much 
lower economic losses for this group, so they were less likely to claim, but they also 
thought that older people might be more accepting of poorer outcomes in later life. 
Sobrun-Maharaj et al. (2010) investigated the low rate of claiming for Asian communities 
in New Zealand through interviews and focus groups. They found barriers pertaining to: 
language, both in application forms and the lack of interpreters needed to deal with 
assessors during the process; fears about Western medicine amongst elders; tensions for 
assessors to provide culturally appropriate services, as against providing the same service 
for all; and a belief that claiming jeopardised future employment.  
Bismark et al. (2006b) found that Maori and Pacific communities were less likely to claim. 
They suffer from social deprivation in many areas, such as education, justice and health, 
and with other socially deprived communities, were also disadvantaged regarding 
compensation for medical injuries. Bismark et al. (2006b) concluded that the ‘no-fault’ 
system exhibited the same effects as tort for these social groups.  
The final characteristic of interest was the type of injury. In New Zealand, those with 
temporary disability, or families of those that had died, did not tend to claim. Bismark et 
al. (2006) concluded that patients and their families did not see enough economic 
advantage in doing so.  
In their conclusion, Bismark et al. (2006b) commented that these patterns of claiming 
were common across all schemes, whether in New Zealand or Scandinavia. 
Scheme characteristics 
There was some discussion as to whether the schemes themselves might present barriers 
to claiming (Bismark et al. 2006a; Siegal et al. 2008).  
Bismark et al. (2006a) argued that the idea of ‘fault’ may discourage doctors from 
disclosing an accident and injury, therefore patients may not realise that they have 
injuries that are compensable; this would contribute to under-claiming. It was thought 
that the changes to the New Zealand scheme, which took away the notion of fault and 
moved to the eligibility criterion of ‘treatment injury’, would overcome problems with 
disclosure.  
In discussing the schemes in Florida and Virginia, Siegal et al. (2008) pointed to the burden 
of proving causation placed on the claimants as a problem. The need to hire lawyers to do 
this mimics the tort system. Inequality became apparent, as those who could afford a 
lawyer succeeded in achieving higher damages.  
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In Florida and Virginia there is differential access to the schemes, as they are controlled 
by sign-up of providing physicians and hospitals, with not all physicians and health care 
providers choosing to participate. Some observers thought that this might disadvantage 
poorer people allocated to physicians and hospitals not participating in schemes, who may 
have limited choices regarding legal representation if subsequently required. Mandatory 
sign-up for all physicians might make the system more equal (Siegal et al. 2008).  
3.3.1.3 Justice 3: Transparency of process 
Transparency of process achieves justice through the representation of the claimant, 
and mechanisms that improve the consistency of decision making through the use of 
medical experts and the consideration of precedents. 
Considering the two types of schemes under comparison, the mainly administrative 
schemes from Scandinavia and New Zealand, and those with a greater influence from the 
tort system, it is apparent that they rely on different mechanisms to achieve 
trustworthiness. The administrative schemes place greater emphasis on medical expertise 
and referral to previous decisions to ensure consistency of decisions (Kachalia et al. 2008), 
whilst the tort-influenced systems allow more opportunities for medical and legal 
representation (Barbot et al. 2014; Siegal et al. 2008). 
Representation 
There are various ways a victim might be represented in compensation processes. Most 
commonly representation is carried out by lawyers, but claimant advocacy is also taken up 
by patient groups in France, or through political appointees in the Virginia scheme.  
The schemes in Virginia and Florida are closely tied to the legal system, as claimants will 
often use lawyers to file claims and to represent them at hearings (Siegal et al. 2008). In 
Florida, they also use lawyers to argue that they are not bound by the compensation 
scheme. In Virginia, the appeals process is carried out by political appointees, rather than 
medical or legal experts. In France, patient groups are represented on decision-making 
committees in line with the notion of solidarity at the heart of their scheme (Barbot et al. 
2014). In Scandinavia and New Zealand, claimants have the right to be represented by 
patient advocates in the appeals process, although in New Zealand, claimants rarely take 
this up (Kachalia et al. 2008).  
Representation by lawyers may increase trust in the system by clarifying the medical 
issues for the client (Murtagh et al. 2012; Siegal et al. 2008) and acting as an ally against 
the state and the medical establishment. Murtagh et al. (2012) found that respondents 
were more likely to consult lawyers if offered a generous compensation payment. They 
commented that this might reflect distrust in the medical establishment and a desire to 
understand whether the offer was fair. The respondents may also regard the offer as part 
of a risk management strategy, rather than an outcome of professional ethics. Lawyers in 
these circumstances may prove helpful in facilitating an early settlement if they can 
confirm that the offer was reasonable (Murtagh et al. 2012).  
Similarly, road traffic accident claimants were more satisfied with their interaction with 
lawyers than with insurance companies (Elbers et al. 2013), possibly because they were 
considered allies. Elbers et al. found that procedural fairness, e.g. increasing the 
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opportunities for claimants to participate actively in the compensation process by 
expressing their views and feelings, improved patients’ quality of life.  
However, observers in Siegal et al. (2008) found significant problems with the involvement 
of legal representation. They thought that the more adversarial legal process slowed up 
the system of decision making and soured relations between the claimant and the 
compensation authorities. This made care more difficult to deliver in a timely and 
acceptable way. They also pointed to inconsistencies in decision making by political 
appointees, due to their lack of medical or legal training.  
Consistency of decision making 
Given the difficulties of establishing the causality of medical injuries in the context of 
contested and evolving medical science (Siegal et al. 2008), the importance of retaining 
medical expertise to advise in the compensation process was acknowledged in all of the 
papers. However, medical experts did not make decisions but were called upon by 
assessors for their opinions about difficult cases (Barbot et al. 2014; Kachalia et al. 2008; 
Siegal et al. 2008). In Scandinavia and New Zealand, experienced assessors with clinical 
and legal expertise gather material from families and experts to inform their decisions 
about eligibility and level of compensation. They then write to the claimant to inform 
them of their decision (Kachalia et al. 2008). Consistency of decision making is maintained 
through the specialisation of the reviewer in areas of medical injury, reliance on a pool of 
medical experts retained by the company for opinions about difficult cases, and referral 
by the reviewer to previous cases which had been catalogued by the compensation 
authorities (Kachalia et al. 2008).  
In Florida and Virginia, medical experts review all claims by examining the child and 
relevant medical records, but the final decisions are made by a judge in Florida or a 
commissioner in Virginia. In France, claimants have access to free medical expertise only 
after their case has been accepted as compensable. There was some variation as to how 
the boundaries of admissibility were defined in different regional jurisdictions in the 
French scheme, which affected access to medical expertise (Barbot et al. 2014).  
In their evaluation of the schemes in Florida and Virginia, Siegal et al. (2008) suggested 
that training for the medical experts to support their understanding of legal terms and the 
creation of guidelines to aid decision making would improve consistency. They considered 
that consulting previous decisions made by the compensation authorities and greater 
exchange of information about decisions between experts would also improve consistency. 
The advantages of attending to consistency was a more transparent and fair decision-
making process, which led to a more efficient system (Siegal et al. 2008). There was less 
likelihood of challenge through the appeals process if claimants understood the reasons for 
their rejection, and decisions by the authorities were more likely to be upheld. 
Establishing trust in the system also enabled decisions to be made at assessor level, as in 
Scandinavia and New Zealand, rather than requiring a two-tier system of hearings (Siegal 
et al. 2008). 
Commentators on the Scandinavian schemes thought that the ‘avoidability’ criterion was a 
more efficient standard to apply, since deciding what could have been done in the best 
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hands was regarded as simpler than judging whether a provider’s action fell below the 
customary standard of care (Kachalia et al. 2008).  
There were some disadvantages identified by observers in the Siegal et al. (2008) study, 
particularly concerning the medical experts. There were some concerns about conflicts of 
interest: given the small community of obstetrician-gynaecologists it was conceivable that 
experts would know personally the provider in any given case, potentially jeopardising 
their impartiality. Others were of the view that experts in the programme should be 
barred from providing expertise in malpractice litigation, since they might be swayed by 
the possibility of monetary gain as an expert in a court case.  
The main concern of Siegal et al. (2008) was the lack of institutional memory in Florida 
and Virginia, due to the narrow range of experts and the lack of cataloguing of previous 
cases to enable referral to precedents. This is less a disadvantage of systems to improve 
consistency, but a recognition of the efforts needed to create and maintain them.  
 
3.3.1.4 Justice 4: Compensation decoupled from disciplinary procedures 
Creating a ‘Chinese wall’4 between compensation procedures and disciplinary 
procedures enables improved access to justice and a more efficient compensation 
scheme, since physicians are more ready to hand over the relevant information. 
The compensation schemes in Scandinavia and New Zealand operate parallel systems of 
compensation and disciplinary procedures where the compensation system does not report 
to the authorities on individual doctors for disciplinary reasons (Mello et al. 2011). In New 
Zealand, this is an important mechanism, since claimants need to obtain support from 
doctors to make a claim. The fear of reputational and career repercussions for physicians 
was put forward as one reason for the low rate of compensation claims for medical injury 
in the previous version of the New Zealand scheme, since many people did not realise that 
they had a compensable claim, as providers were not disclosing iatrogenic injuries 
(Bismark et al. 2006a). The reforms in 2005 were designed in part to overcome this block 
to disclosure.  
Doctors have responded to the reforms by assisting patients to claim and by providing 
information in a more timely way. In New Zealand, since the 2005 reforms, this has 
shortened the time to decision from 5 months to 13 days (Wallis 2013). Malcolm and 
Barnett (2007) attributed the greater readiness to disclose and the improved 
communication with patients by hospitals in New Zealand to the compensation schemes 
and the parallel complaints procedures. Wallis (2013) charted the decline in disciplinary 
procedures as a result of the ‘Chinese wall’ between the compensation process and the 
complaints system, which suggests that it affects accountability and also deterrence. 
These concerns will be discussed further under clinical outcomes and the theme of patient 
safety.  
                                            
4 A barrier that separates two or more groups, usually as a means of restricting the flow of information 
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3.3.2 Clinical practice  
This section explores the mechanisms under which tort reform and no-fault compensations 
schemes are thought to lead to improvement in clinical practice outcomes (see Figure 
3.2). Of the 14 papers contributing to an understanding of the effect of tort reforms on 
clinical practice, the majority draw on the medical-legal context in the USA (n=9). Further 
studies also add to our theoretical understanding by drawing on wider international 
contexts of compensation schemes and tort reform (n=5).  
 
Figure 3.2: Clinical practice outcomes  
 
 
3.3.2.1 Clinical practice 1: Defensive medicine 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests and procedures and improve access 
to health care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by clinicians because doctors are less 
likely to practise positive and/or negative defensive medicine to protect themselves 
from litigation.  
The effect of malpractice pressure on physician behaviour is referred to as defensive 
medicine. This arises as doctors attempt to protect themselves against potential litigation 
by over-cautious ordering of tests and conservative treatment, i.e. positive defensive 
medicine, or by restricting or denying care or treatment to patients considered as ‘riskier’ 
by clinicians, either because of the seriousness of their illness (e.g. Konety et al. 2005) or 
because of socio-economic determinants (e.g. Dubay  et al. 2001), i.e. negative defensive 
medicine. The costs of defensive medicine to the health system far outweigh the damages 
awarded in malpractice litigation, given the extent of under-claiming for medical injury, 
so it has been a topic of great interest to international policy makers (Kessler n.d.). 
Researchers have also examined defensive medicine’s effect on the practices of doctors, 
access to care and outcomes. 
The majority of papers discussing defensive medicine report on studies conducted in the 
USA, where the debate about the effectiveness of tort reforms has focused on whether 
defensive medicine exists sufficiently to warrant the restrictions placed on jurors when 
awarding damages (Kessler n.d.). Much of the debate centres on obstetric practice, as this 
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is a highly litigious area, which makes these papers very relevant to this review (Cheng et 
al. 2014; Dubay et al. 2001; Jena et al. 2015; Sakala et al. 2013; Sartwalle and Johnstone 
2014; Shurtz 2013; Xu et al. 2013, Yang et al. 2009, 2012). However, the context of 
insurance premiums, reimbursement practices and the restricted access to care in the US 
system makes some of these findings less relevant to the UK context. One paper 
specifically examined OECD no-fault schemes in order to establish the extent of defensive 
medicine in countries with NFCSs, but did not focus on birth trauma (Vandersteegen et al. 
2015).  
Tort reforms in the US began with restrictions on non-economic damages enacted in 
California in 1975 to lower insurance premiums for physicians and halt their exodus from 
the profession and to other jurisdictions with less malpractice pressure (Kessler n.d.). 
Other American states have followed, with similar limitations on damages, including 
reducing payments for medical expenses so that plaintiffs are not personally reimbursed 
for costs already borne by their insurance company, known as the collateral source offset 
rule, and limiting the period during which plaintiffs can file a suit. These measures have 
reduced claims and awards and alleviating malpractice pressure in these states (Hugman 
2007; Kessler n.d.). 
International literature suggested that strong incentives may exist for doctors to practice 
defensive medicine. They do not bear the costs of the extra tests that they are free to 
order, but they do bear the personal costs of reputation loss from lawsuits, even if they do 
not pay damages to the plaintiff personally. These damages are paid by the NHS in the UK 
or the insurance company in the US (Keren-Paz 2010, Kessler n.d.). The ordering of tests 
may be tempered by state-administered systems, such as Medicaid, which have less 
generous reimbursement terms, but restrictions on payment may then affect whether 
doctors offer care to patients covered by these schemes (Dubay et al. 2001). Reputation 
loss will affect future career opportunities and financial losses in the US, where patients 
choose their doctors. It also results in mental distress and loss of confidence, as Robertson 
and Thomson (2014, 2016) found in interviews with midwives involved in court cases in the 
UK.  
Establishing the presence of defensive medicine is usually carried out by examining the 
effects on health budgets after the pressure of malpractice liability is lessened through 
the introduction of tort reform. In their review of the best evidence for the relationship 
between tort reform and Caesarean section rates (a common positive defensive medicine 
strategy in obstetrics), Sakala et al. (2013) found that there was no association between 
liability pressure and avoidance behaviour. Likewise, others have found no statistically or 
economically significant effects of malpractice pressure on the cost or quality of health 
care more broadly (Baicker and Chandra 2005; Baicker et al. 2007; Hellinger and Encinosa 
2006), which would suggest that defensive medicine is not practised enough to be affected 
by the lessening of malpractice pressure.  
However, in his economic modelling of the effects of negative defensive medicine, 
Montanera (2016) points out that these studies do not take enough notice of the effects of 
reducing malpractice pressure on enabling greater access to health care for riskier groups. 
His conclusions were that for low-risk populations, such as those from wealthier 
backgrounds and with an illness or condition in a medical speciality with low litigation 
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risk, tort reform would reduce spending on unnecessary procedures and so save money for 
the health system. However, for a high-risk population, such as those from poorer 
backgrounds and with an illness or condition served by a medical speciality of high 
litigation risk, costs to the health system would rise as these people gained greater access 
to health care. Thus, tort reform could not deliver both savings to the health system and 
improved quality of care, if the population was homogeneous. In the case of positive 
defensive medicine, the health system would save money from tort reform if the 
population was wealthy or had illnesses and conditions served by a medical speciality of 
low litigation risk. In the case of negative defensive medicine, costs would rise as access 
improved because poorer and riskier patients would have access to medical care, which 
had been denied previously. It might be able to deliver both if the population was 
heterogeneous, but there would be a tendency towards savings or quality of care 
depending on the make-up of the population. Therefore, he did not support the conclusion 
from the empirical studies showing no statistical effects that doctors did not practise 
defensive medicine, but rather explained that these studies were conducted with a 
heterogeneous population.  
Vandersteegen et al. (2015) examined the differences in health care spending between 
countries with NFCSs which decoupled compensation from disciplinary procedures, such as 
those in New Zealand, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland, and those that did 
not, such as those in France and Belgium. They argued that compensation schemes that 
protected the reputation of the doctors would result in less over-cautious practice. They 
found that those no-fault systems with decoupling had lower spending on health care 
(−0.06%), whilst those without had higher spending (+0.06) when compared to health care 
spending in 34 OECD countries. Figures for health care spending came from a literature 
review of studies comparing expenditures in OECD countries. In the final estimation of 
expenditures, GDP per capita, the age profile of the population, the number of physicians 
per 1,000 citizens, the proportion of publicly funded health care as a measure of the 
political environment and a test to take account of macro-economic effects and the rate 
of technological change were controlled for. The best results (−0.11%) were found for 
those compensation systems that were privately financed through pooled insurance 
schemes.  
Positive defensive medicine can change practices in various ways, such as increasing 
referrals to specialists (Xu et al. 2013) increasing diagnostic tests and using tests of 
spurious medical value (Sartwalle and Johnstone 2014). Many studies examine the use of 
Caesarean section as a positive defensive strategy, since clinicians believe that it makes 
the birth process easier to control (Cheng et al. 2014; Jena et al. 2015; Shurtz 2013; Yang 
et al. 2009) although this finding has yet to be fully empirically tested. In non-UK 
contexts, experience of litigation and medical error made doctors more likely to 
recommend Caesareans (Cheng et al. 2014, Shurtz 2013). Jena et al. (2015) found that 
greater spending on resources and higher Caesarean rates predicted lower rates of 
malpractice claims. Sartwalle and Johnstone (2014) questioned the use of electronic 
foetal heart monitoring as a tool to diagnose cerebral palsy in unborn babies, as changes 
in heart rate picked up by the monitor can trigger Caesareans. Although clinical trials have 
consistently shown that electronic foetal monitoring produces false positive results in 
99.8% of cases, lack of monitoring is taken as negligent behaviour in most lawsuits. They 
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called upon professional bodies to produce guidelines to support physicians defending 
themselves in court where foetal monitoring was an issue.  
In the US, Dubay et al. (2001) investigated the role that negative defensive medicine 
played in the utilisation of prenatal care and the subsequent health of their infants for 
women from differing socio-economic backgrounds. This was measured by ethnicity, 
marital status and educational attainment. They did not find any substantial effects on 
infant health, but they did find that unmarried, lower-educated and black women were 
more likely to have fewer prenatal visits and less later care, since they were offered 
fewer appointments. These effects were ameliorated when insurance premiums were 
lower due to tort reforms. They concluded that reducing malpractice pressures enabled 
greater access to care for women who were more likely to be covered by Medicaid. They 
argued that, although the increased prenatal care did not improve the health of the infant 
and therefore could be considered ‘socially wasteful’, the costs of prenatal care would be 
more than offset by savings in unnecessary Caesareans offered to the women from the 
higher socio-economic categories.  
One of the most common arguments for high malpractice pressure is that it leads to more 
cautious practice and therefore higher-quality outcomes. In the US, Yang et al. (2012) 
examined this deterrence effect in terms of birth outcomes and found that there was no 
difference in outcomes between states with tort reforms and those without. They argued 
that delivery methods prompted by malpractice pressures did not improve outcomes 
because the aim of the delivery choice was staving off liability risk rather than improving 
quality of care.  
3.3.3 Patient safety  
The conditions under which patient safety can be improved as a result of tort reform 
and/or the introduction of NFCSs is drawn from 10 papers. The two key outcomes 
identified in the literature focus on how different mechanisms can support clinicians to 
more readily admit to errors and the extent to which mechanisms can be put in place to 
enable learning from those errors (see Figure 3.3). Just over half of the papers reflect on 
the introduction of an NFCS in New Zealand (n=4) and schemes currently available in the 
Nordic countries (n=2).  
Figure 3.3: Patient safety outcomes  
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3.3.3.1 Patient safety 1: Admitting to error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling physicians to disclose iatrogenic injury 
through the removal of personal liability, applying the avoidability criterion and 
decoupling compensation from disciplinary procedures. 
The NFCSs stand in contrast to the tort system, where it is suggested that the dominant 
paradigm is more likely to be one of health professionals’ silence, where claims of 
negligence against individual physicians can create strong feelings of guilt, a loss of self-
confidence and damage to reputation (Mello et al. 2006). This can lead many clinicians to 
be reticent about sharing information about adverse events with patients, colleagues or 
the responsible authorities in health establishments. By removing individual liability, it is 
argued, NFCSs enable greater disclosure and increase the possibility of learning from 
medical error.  
One reform of the tort system in the US has introduced the idea of holding institutions 
accountable for medical error, i.e. ‘enterprise liability’, rather than the individual 
physician (Kachalia et al. 2016). This liability reform takes into account any broader 
systems failures that may have contributed to claimants’ injuries and so may influence 
improvements in procedures throughout the system. Since individual doctors are unlikely 
to have more than one malpractice suit against them in their career, but institutions, such 
as a hospital, are more likely to have multiple suits filed against them, then patterns of 
negligence may emerge which could point the way to possible system-wide improvements 
in patient safety.  
Mello et al. (2006) advocate a move from negligence to an avoidability standard in order 
to reduce the psychological pressures of disclosure for doctors, where the notion of 
substandard care is replaced with one of suboptimal care. This change in standard accepts 
the possibility that avoidable injuries can happen despite the excellence of the physicians 
and the high quality of the care offered at hospitals.  
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In New Zealand and the Scandinavian countries, the compensation schemes are decoupled 
from disciplinary procedures. This enables doctors to disclose errors without damaging 
their reputations and their future careers. In the 2005 New Zealand reforms, the ACC was 
no longer required to report individual clinicians to professional disciplinary boards to 
establish medical error, as the eligibility criteria was changed to include all treatment 
injury. Before the reforms, Bismark and Paterson (2006) found that compensation 
procedures were delayed, as doctors defended themselves by withholding information as 
they challenged claims made against them.  
The final removal of the fault-based criteria was also extended to the pre-existing duty to 
report all findings of medical error to the Medical Council, New Zealand’s professional 
standards body for clinicians, and replaced with a new duty to report ‘risk of harm to the 
public’ and to the ‘authorities responsible for patient safety’ (Wallis 2013 p.34). 
Separating the compensation process from disciplinary procedures has arguably freed 
health care providers to disclose information about medical injuries and is more in line 
with ‘the requirements of a no-blame culture of openness and learning as advocated by 
patient safety experts’ (Wallis and Dovey 2011 p.587).  
However, Wallis (2013) raises concerns about the decreasing numbers of doctors brought 
before disciplinary committees since 2005 and questions the apparent conclusion that 
there are few negligent doctors in New Zealand. From studies published at the turn of the 
century, Bismark and Paterson (2006) cite the rate of medical error in New Zealand as 
being comparable to adverse events in jurisdictions with similar health systems – a 12.9% 
adverse event rate compared to 16.6% in Australia and 10.8% in the UK – and so the New 
Zealand scheme does not seem to offer any particular advantages regarding patient 
safety. Wallis (2013) concludes that the decoupling of compensation and disciplinary 
processes has not led to increased openness and learning about injury, but there is also no 
evidence that the 2005 reforms have led to worse patient care. This unwillingness to 
admit to mistakes may also be a product of the professional culture of doctors as well as 
fears about peer ostracism and loss of reputation (Mello et al. 2006; Morreim 2004).  
3.3.3.2 Patient safety 2: Learning from error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling the pooling and sharing of information about 
medical errors and by reframing the compensation process as a patient safety strategy 
rather than a risk management strategy. 
The emphasis on establishing negligence under the tort-based system can lead to 
malpractice cases being seen as ‘a random event not associated with quality’, and 
therefore the litigation process misses the opportunity to support health care providers to 
‘understand the causes of avoidable injury and try to prevent recurrences’ (Mello et al. 
2006 p. 472). Administrative compensation schemes seek to reduce the pressure of tort 
liability which encourages a wall of silence about adverse outcomes, in order to increase 
the possibilities for learning from error.  
No-fault schemes enable learning from error through the centralised compiling of error 
information as part of the claims process, and making this information available to 
interested parties, such as research and patient safety experts (Kachalia et al. 2016; Mello 
et al. 2006). In the tort system, information on medical error is often buried in a disparate 
and fragmented set of proprietary databases maintained by insurance companies and self-
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insured health systems, which may not be accessible for research and quality improvement 
purposes (Kachalia et al. 2016). The adversarial nature of litigation procedures can also 
lead to a bias towards only collecting information on the process of care in relation to its 
relevance for proving cases of negligence rather than identifying failure in the health care 
system (Kachalia et al. 2016).  
However, the issue of data relevance is also pertinent for administrative compensation 
schemes. Jonsson and Øvretveit (2008) assessed the scientific value of the data held on 
medical complaints and compensation claims available across three separate databases in 
Sweden.5 They found that despite the extensive detail available in all three databases, the 
material’s utility for learning about medical error was limited because the data was 
primarily used to assess eligibility in individual patient cases, and did not include the 
range of information needed to assess medical safety performance overall; the link 
between individual cases and wider patterns within the health system could not be made. 
In their conclusions, they considered the context of claiming, since more claims are made 
as patients become increasingly aware of their rights, so a rise in claims does not 
necessarily mean that health systems are becoming more unsafe. Patients are also 
claiming within the ever-changing medical system, where specialities may be transformed 
by the introduction of new treatments and drugs. Therefore, the type of claim may alter 
considerably over time.  
The 2005 reforms made to the New Zealand compensation process sought to enhance its 
focus on ‘systems learning’ from medical error by ensuring that the scheme was not driven 
by a concern to assign blame to individual health practitioners but to enhance patient 
safety (Wallis, 2013). However, there were concerns that such a no-fault system, which 
decouples compensation from disciplinary procedures, would eliminate individual- and 
medical systems-level accountability and the learning that can be acquired from the 
complaints procedure. This led to the creation of the Office of the Health and Disability 
Commissioner to investigate complaints, often using mediation, to support further efforts 
to improve patient safety (Bismark and Paterson 2006). Increasingly, the commissioner has 
used strategies such as performance review and required training for doctors to rectify 
deficiencies in performance rather than the disciplinary process in his response to 
complaints (Wallis 2013). Thus the lack of disciplinary hearings may reflect this strategy 
rather than signal a less accountable system.  
In the US, Hyman et al. (2010) evaluated a mediation programme designed to bring 
together plaintiffs and defendants to resolve disputes without resorting to the courts. 
They argued that since mediation took a problem-solving, collaborative, open-
communication approach, it could support the exchange of information between patient 
and doctor and so increase patient safety. However, the approach borrowed heavily from 
the tort system and both parties were represented by lawyers during the mediation 
process. This made it impossible to reframe the process away from risk management 
towards a focus on patient safety, as the training and culture of the lawyers recreated the 
adversarial system of the court. Often only the lawyers were present, and usually neither 
the doctors nor the hospital representatives attended. Inevitably, the lawyers did not have 
                                            
5 The Medical Responsibility Board, which decides on disciplinary action when a complaint of negligence or 
malpractice is made; Patients Advisory Committees, which deal with a range of complaints made about health 
staff; and the Patient Insurance Fund, which holds case reports to establish if compensation is awarded.  
3. Findings 
39 
 
the clinical training or experience to identify changes that could be made to improve 
safety, so opportunities for system change were missed. The authors reflected that even 
though hospital management staff took part sometimes, they maintained a risk 
management stance rather than patient safety perspective and therefore were not 
attuned to the options for change contained within the complaints.  
The possibility of learning from malpractice claims is clearly affected by the claims 
process. The databases set up by the administrative systems enable an analysis that 
informs patient safety strategies (e.g. Pukk-Härenstam et al. 2008), but care needs to be 
taken about the conclusions that are drawn from the data. The adversarial nature of the 
tort system denies these possibilities since the risk management nature of the process 
excludes a patient safety approach.  
3.3.4 Health outcomes 
3.3.4.1 Introduction 
Observations of claimants in compensation processes have documented their slower 
recovery to health as opposed to those who have not claimed or who are not compensable 
(Bhandari et al. 2008; Gabbe et al. 2007; Harris et al. 2008). The negative impact of 
litigation on health arises because claimants are encouraged to maintain their injured 
status in order to claim compensation, i.e. secondary gain, and they are exposed to the 
stress of medical examination, delays in decision making and the adversarialism inherent 
in the litigation process, i.e., secondary victimisation.  
There seem to be few studies that directly measure the effects of NFCSs and tort reform 
on the health and well-being of claimants. This may be a result of the difficulties of 
establishing the impact of litigation on mental health and physical recovery. A key issue 
for this kind of research is establishing causality, since those in poorer health may be more 
likely to claim compensation rather than the compensation process leading to poorer 
outcomes. In this introduction, we summarise the research that has considered this impact 
before we go on to look at the studies that may contribute to our understanding of the 
impact of no-fault schemes.  
Spearing and Connelly (2011) conducted a review of systematic reviews to examine the 
health effects of litigation and worker compensation schemes on claimants. The commonly 
held view that compensation schemes have deleterious effects on both mental and 
physical health could not be supported, they concluded, because of the quality of the 
research. The studies did not take into account the wide variation in schemes across 
different jurisdictions; they did not consider the a priori health status of the claimants, 
but relied on post-claim measures of health; and they used proxy measures of health, such 
as return to work and time to closure, which the authors questioned as suitable given that 
other factors may influence these events.  
Similarly, Elbers et al. (2013) found that the low quality of studies in their review did not 
allow a confident conclusion about the link between the mental health of claimants and 
the compensation process. They found that the compensation group already had higher 
levels of mental illness at baseline in comparison to those who were not in the 
compensation process, and that this difference explained about three-quarters of the 
effect of compensation at post measurement. Additionally, the studies were highly 
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heterogeneous in terms of the type of compensation scheme, outcome measures and 
measurement points, and imprecise, with large confidence intervals and possible 
publication bias. However, they did conclude that the compensation process, specifically 
litigation, did not support claimants psychologically.  
A later study by Grant et al. (2014), however, examined which aspects of the 
compensation process impacted on the mental well-being of people involved in car 
accidents and work-related injuries. They found evidence for increased levels of distress 
associated with: a lack of information about making a claim (33.9% of the cohort); time 
delays in the compensation process (30.4%); the number of medical assessments (26.9%); 
and the amount of compensation they received (26.1%). These levels of stress predicted 
poorer physical and psychological outcomes when the claimants were followed up six years 
later. Furthermore, Sterling et al. (2010) found that claim lodgement for those with 
whiplash injury was associated with increased post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms in 
all categories of claimant from resilient victims to those with severe symptoms, as well as 
increased neck disability in those with mild to moderate symptoms.  
More recently, Murgatroyd et al. (2015) reviewed studies that had investigated physical 
and psychological effects of the compensation process on claimants who had suffered 
musculoskeletal injury. They were more confident in their conclusions that compensation 
status (making a claim) and the presence of a lawyer did explain some of the level of 
disability experienced by claimants and poor psychological function in studies of high and 
moderate quality. The effects on mental health were greater than those on physical 
health. However, they could not refute the possibility of bias due to reverse causality, 
since of the 13 out of 29 studies that measured baseline health, six found that this 
predicted recovery.  
Type of studies 
All of the studies (n=8) associated with these outcomes are concerned with compensation 
relating to accidents, mostly road traffic accidents, and none are related to iatrogenic 
injury. Some are concerned with accidents at work and are covered by worker 
compensation schemes. Most of these studies were conducted in Australia (n=6). 
Figure 3.4: Patient health outcomes  
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3.3.4.2 Health 1: Physical health 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the physical health of patients by shortening the length 
of time to claim closure and by including a rehabilitative element in the award.  
Cameron et al. (2008) investigated the impact of tort reform in Australia for those 
suffering from whiplash. The reforms included restrictions on access to compensation for 
non-economic loss, the introduction of clinical guidelines for the management of whiplash, 
earlier acceptance of claims and greater provision of earlier treatment. In comparing 
claimants before and after the change in legislation, they asserted that there was a 
significant improvement in the health status of claimants after reform, in terms of 
disability, pain and physical functioning. However, mental functioning did not improve. 
They argued that the focus on rehabilitation had made a physical difference, but the 
psychological problems might continue to be present due the circumstances of the initial 
accident, which would remain unaffected by rehabilitation strategies.  
Exploring the impact of the New Zealand no-fault scheme on physical functioning for those 
with spinal injury, Montgomery et al. (2015) found that there was no difference between 
those who were compensated and those who were not. They compared this finding with 
outcomes from papers reporting on worker compensation schemes. These had a litigious 
element and the time to settlement was usually longer. In these schemes, claimants had 
significantly poorer outcomes than those who did not claim. Since the ACC scheme 
improved the outcomes of litigious worker compensation schemes, we can conclude that 
the no-fault aspect of the schemes conferred some physical benefit on its claimants. 
In the same study, Manson et al. (2015) reported on the return to work rates of those in 
the ACC scheme and found that they were similar to those who had not claimed in the 
papers looking at worker compensation schemes. In their conclusion, they argued that the 
more co-operative rehabilitative environment of the ACC scheme facilitated a quicker 
return to work. This is an important outcome, since longer periods away from the 
workplace mean a greater likelihood of never returning to employment.  
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Harrington et al. (2015) compared the experiences of victims of motor vehicle accidents 
with brain injury in Australian states with no-fault and fault-based schemes. In Victoria, 
all motorists must pay a transport charge at the time of driver registration. This no-fault 
scheme covers payment for acute care, rehabilitation and care and support services, as 
well as regular loss of income payments, allowances for dependants and family members, 
and impairment lump sum payments. In Queensland, access to funding for rehabilitation 
and support is dependent upon a compulsory third-party insurer accepting liability for a 
claim or agreeing to pay for services on a without-prejudice basis. Compensation for loss 
of income, pain and suffering and future suffering are awarded as a lump sum payment, 
often paid out several years after the injury. This can mean that claimants are reliant on 
private funds, other types of insurance and the pensions of carers if they cannot maintain 
their employment before their claim is settled.  
The researchers interviewed adults with brain injury caused by motor vehicle accidents 
who were compensable and non-compensable to explore their experiences of these 
different types of compensation schemes (Harrington et al. 2015). Three themes emerged: 
rehabilitation-focused pathways vs resource-rationed pathways; a sense of security vs 
pressured lives; and bounded choices vs unknown choices.  
In terms of rehabilitation, the victims and their families in Victoria had earlier and more 
comprehensive access to care, support and services. The focus of these services was to 
rehabilitate the victims so that they could live as independently as possible, and families 
received training to support this aim. Those in Queensland experienced pressures to quit 
hospital, since the insurance schemes would not necessarily fully pay for their care, if 
they were compensable. The insurance companies would pay for therapies but not 
necessarily access to therapies, which caused problems for rural families. Access to 
support and therapies were delayed as liability was established, and, in some cases this 
delay may have contributed to slower or partial recovery.  
 
3.3.4.3 Health 2: Mental health 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the mental health of patients by shortening the length 
of time to claim closure and by removing the adversarial element of the tort system. 
Few papers examined the effects of no-fault schemes on the mental health of victims. 
However, looking at the studies by Grant et al. (2014) and Sterling et al. (2010), we can 
reasonably conclude that the shortened time to claim closure and the removal of the 
adversarial element common to no-fault schemes would have beneficial effects. Only 
Gabbe et al. (2007) found that NFCSs were detrimental to mental and physical health 
when claimants were compared to non-claimants in Victoria. They suggested that the 
mental health detriment was due to the cause of the trauma for claimants, i.e. road 
traffic accidents, as opposed to falls in the non-compensable group. They surmised that 
traffic accidents could be more traumatic than falls and that this factor contributed to the 
finding. Although this would not apply to children in the context of their own birth injury, 
shortening the length of time to receive a claim could be of benefit to their parents or 
wider family.  
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Harrington et al. (2015) reported that families in the no-fault scheme in Victoria felt a 
sense of security that they would get help as long as they needed it. In contrast, families 
in Queensland, uncertain of compensation, experienced the pressures of caring for a 
dependant whilst they waited for settlement. Many gave up work to become a carer and 
suffered a loss of income.  
The final concern, explored by Harrington et al. (2015), was the extent of choice offered 
by the Victorian scheme. This could be frustrating for some families if the governmental 
insurer refused to pay for less mainstream therapies, identified by the families as 
beneficial for their dependant. However, in Queensland, families were uncertain about 
what therapies were available and what the insurer would pay for. Only strong advocacy 
enabled greater choice in living arrangements for victims, but this disadvantaged those 
who were less able to argue for their case.  
3.3.4.4 Health and well-being of medical professionals 
We could find no studies that related the mental and physical health of doctors to tort 
reform or NFCSs. We found studies that explored midwives’ experiences of litigation 
(Robertson and Thomson 2014, 2016; Symon 2000), doctors’ reactions to disciplinary 
(Verhoef et al. 2015) and complaints procedures (Bourne et al. 2015), and midwives’ 
feelings about a review and inspection process (Hood et al. 2010). These processes, often 
influenced by litigation practices, caused feelings of anger, shame and misery for the 
clinicians and nurses. They experienced a loss of confidence in their abilities (Robertson 
and Thomson 2014) and some doctors claimed greater use of defensive medicine as a 
result (Bourne et al. 2015).  
We must assume a consensus among researchers that no-fault schemes will benefit the 
health and well-being of doctors and nurses, or not damage their health, at least. Tort 
reforms directly benefit doctors economically in the USA since they tend to lower the 
insurance premiums for doctors. The extent of the benefit to well-being may be tempered 
by the high expectations of themselves that doctors and nurses hold, so that criticism and 
fault finding may be particularly costly to them, psychologically, whether liability is 
established or not.  
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4. Discussion and conclusions  
4.1 Summary of key context, mechanisms and outcome configurations  
Our review aimed to develop preliminary theoretical frameworks of the mechanisms 
influencing engagement in NFCSs. We used a realist approach to understand the 
connections through which different components of NFCSs, operating under certain social 
and political systems, are thought to influence outcomes concerning access to justice, 
clinical practice, patient safety and patient health. The following presents a summary of 
our findings, which provide a justification of the CMO configurations based on our analysis 
of the papers. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of the implications from our CMO 
configurations. 
Firstly, we found varied conceptions of the notion of NFCSs. We accepted papers that 
discussed the effects of tort reform on the insurance system although these were far from 
no-fault schemes. We did this where the effects of tort reform were comparable to no-
fault schemes, for example where the effect of lessening of malpractice pressure on 
doctors and the subsequent impact on defensive medicine were similar to mechanisms in 
no-fault schemes of the decoupling of compensation and disciplinary procedures 
(Vandersteegen et al. 2015).  
Liability was the key variable in the schemes and the concept of blame shaped the 
schemes profoundly. In France, the compensation scheme was an expression of solidarity 
with individuals who had suffered major injury (Barbot et al. 2014), but retained the 
notion of blame and the litigation process for those patients who could establish liability. 
In New Zealand, the country to most clearly dispense with blame, the scheme operated 
like a targeted social security benefit programme with its broad eligibility criterion of 
‘treatment injury’ (Kachalia et al. 2008). In the United States, tort reform seemed to be 
the reluctant consequence of a breakdown in the compensation system when doctors 
could no longer afford the insurance premiums and were leaving the profession (Kessler 
n.d.). These reforms seemed highly contested, with studies competing to show that there 
were large or no effects of these reforms. This research may reflect an anxiety about 
reducing the accountability of the medical profession and restricting access to legal 
redress.  
Evidently, the schemes were a product of their jurisdictions. In New Zealand and 
Scandinavia, with their universal health care provision, the creation of a state-run 
compensation scheme fitted with their conception of health care as an important provision 
by central government. In the United States, there was understandable reluctance to deny 
claimants the possibility of attaining damages through the court process since there was 
less of a social security safety net to support individuals with ongoing ill health and 
disability.  
Many of the writers in this sample were critical of the tort system and its role in the 
compensation process. They described it as imprecise, since some undeserving claimants 
were successful, and many deserving cases were unsuccessful, and commented that in 
some social jurisdictions without access to legal aid, it was unfair, favouring those who 
could afford to pay for expensive lawyers and discriminating against the poor. There were 
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damaging effects on claimants, on their physical and mental health (e.g. Grant et al. 
2014; Sterling et al. 2010), and on their incomes. The tort system caused distress for 
doctors and nurses, causing early exits from the profession, long-term sick leave 
(Robertson and Thomson 2014) and claims by doctors of a greater likelihood of practising 
defensive medicine (Bourne et al. 2015). There were costs to the health system as a 
whole, particularly in the defensive practices of over-ordering of tests and conservative 
treatments as clinicians sought to protect themselves against malpractice suits. Further, 
negative defensive medicine contributed to inequalities in health systems.  
The empirical research attempted to test out the effect of no-fault schemes and tort 
reform on these issues. This research alongside more theoretical contributions, enabled 
the development of propositions which explained the observed effects of no-fault schemes 
and tort reform when they were compared to the tort system. These explanations gave 
reasons for: the more precise targeting of compensation (Davis et al. 2002); the impacts 
on physical and mental health outcomes (Cameron et al. 2008; Montgomery et al. 2015) 
and health system costs (Vandersteegan et al. 2015); the more equitable access to justice 
(Bismark et al. 2006a, 2006b) and health care (Dubay et al. 2001); the importance of 
procedural justice (Siegal et al. 2008); the possibilities of improved patient safety (Wallis 
2013); and the limited information on medical error (Wallis 2015). There was a lack of 
studies regarding the physical and mental health impacts of no-fault schemes where the 
claimants had suffered an injury as a result of medical treatment. The mental health 
detriment suffered by those experiencing injury through medical error may be greater 
than those injured in car accidents, since iatrogenic injury may represent a breakdown in 
trust not experienced by car accident victims.  
4.2 Strengths and limitations  
The process we adopted aimed to focus on the needs of policy makers as they considered 
different policy options, and allowed for iteration as researchers and policy makers 
considered the most relevant issues for exploration. Using this process, we developed our 
CMO configurations in consultation with the policy team at the DH. This suggested a 
greater focussing on justice, health and clinical outcomes, which narrowed down our 
searching and supported a deeper engagement with issues of current relevance to the 
team.  
As in all realist reviews, we relied on snowballing techniques, picking up terms in papers 
as we read them in order to use them in limited searches, as well as mining papers for 
citations and searching for papers that cited included studies. In this respect, the process 
of identifying the studies to include in the review is not entirely replicable.  
Throughout the review, the team engaged in discussions about the included papers in 
order to refine the CMOs and to check our understanding of the arguments, results and 
conclusions of the papers. Two researchers carried out data extraction on the included 
studies and met to discuss the clarification of the initial CMOs, the structuring of the 
evidence and the contribution of each of the papers. We have not assessed the studies for 
quality but we have assessed them for relevance to the review questions. This was an 
appropriate approach in this review, as we were not using the papers to determine cause 
and effect, but to identify the range of possible mechanisms that might influence 
engagement in NFCSs. The papers are not directly comparable since some are empirical 
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studies, some are policy reviews and one uses economic modelling; we did not include 
opinion pieces, commentaries or editorials as we found the most useful studies to be those 
with some evidential basis.  
4.3 Implications  
This group of studies suggests that NFCSs can confer benefits on key stakeholders, namely 
patients, health professionals and the health system as a whole. The possible benefits 
range from improved targeting of compensation to those most deserving of it, to speedier 
physical recovery after injury.  
However, the complexity of the interactions between compensation processes, individual 
circumstances and the health systems in which the schemes are embedded make it 
difficult to establish strong causal pathways, most notably regarding health outcomes.  
The shape of the schemes will be highly influenced by the health system context which, in 
turn, is affected by the prevailing political opinion about the role of the state in health 
care. 
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Part II Technical description of the review  
6. Detailed methods 
This chapter describes in more detail the methods used to conduct the review. Here we 
provide a more detailed account of the iterative methods used to conduct the first part of 
a realist approach in a short policy time frame. The review was conducted in overlapping 
stages in order to focus on particular issues identified by the UK Department of Health as 
being most relevant for its needs. 
6.1 Type of review: realist theory development  
Similar to existing realist reviews, such as Molnar et al. (2015 p.2), we sought to facilitate 
‘a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that connect the context’ of no-fault 
compensation schemes with differing outcomes. The review aims and questions are well-
suited to an examination of mechanisms triggered by context, as we consider different 
types of fault-based and no-fault compensations schemes, in existence across a range of 
social jurisdictions, to explore how they might achieve greater uptake and improved 
outcomes. Typically, realist reviews contain two distinct phases: 1) the identification of 
the context, mechanisms and outcome configurations (CMOs); and 2) the identification 
and analysis of literature that seeks to tests those theoretical configurations. To fit within 
a specific policy time frame (December 2015 to April 2016), we drew on rapid realist 
methods (Saul et al. 2013) and focus solely on the first part of a realist review: the initial 
CMO theory development. However, we also provide a justification and, to support the 
development of preliminary CMOs, theoretical frameworks.  
This review was conducted in overlapping and iterative stages: 1) initial searching and 
defining of the scope of the review through concept mining and framework formulation; 2) 
iterative searching and screening of primary studies; 3) assessment of relevance and data 
extraction of papers; and 4) evidence-informed CMO framework theory development 
(Rycroft-Malone et al. 2012; Saul et al. 2013). 
6.2 User involvement  
Consultation with key stakeholders is considered important to the production of a relevant 
piece of research (Rees and Oliver 2012; Saul et al. 2013). However, the short timeline 
necessitated a limited amount of public consultation to inform this realist review. Instead 
we undertook several discussions with key policy leads within the Department of Health 
responsible for medical litigation. Meeting regularly with the policy leads and 
commissioners throughout the review process enabled us to ensure that the review is 
closely aligned with their needs and emerging policy requirements. The initial meeting 
included a discussion of the scope and key challenges of the topic area, namely the lack of 
UK evidence in birth injury, leading to the broadening of the review criteria to draw on a 
wider evidence base extending to medical and non-medical injury. In subsequent meetings 
based on the initial scoping we were able to present some initial CMO configurations and 
narrow the focus to their particular outcomes of interest. We also circulated and met to 
discuss interim CMO configurations by outcome to ensure that the structure and content of 
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the configurations and their explanatory text was useful and in line with their 
expectations. By submitting draft findings in advance, as available, we could thus use the 
feedback in the next explanatory account of the CMO configurations, shaping the overall 
report.  
6.3 Stage 1: Defining and scoping the evidence: concept mining and framework 
formulation  
6.3.1 Conceptual framework and preliminary CMO framework  
The initial conceptual framework guiding the examination of factors potentially 
influencing uptake of compensation schemes was based on the key features of schemes 
identified in the review by Farrell et al. (2010 pp.8-9). These include: 
 eligibility and threshold disability criteria 
 limitations to the extent of cover 
 levels of entitlements 
 simpler and more comprehensive access to justice 
 restricted access to courts  
 the existence of a comprehensive national social welfare/social insurance system. 
 
During the protocol development, we began by taking the key features outlined above, 
and read some key studies to develop initial hypothetical configurations between CMOs 
(see Table 6.1). These example CMOs appeared in the protocol. We defined and 
understood context to consist of the compensation schemes for injuries occurring during 
birth and early childhood or in other comparable injury-related contexts, as they are 
played out in Western societies. Mechanisms included the factors potentially contributing 
to claimant engagement with compensation schemes, in addition to other types of 
mechanisms triggered by the ways compensation schemes might be designed and 
implemented.  
Table 6.1: Initial conceptual framework: Context, intervention mechanisms and types of 
outcomes: Examples of CMO configurations  
Context: Compensation schemes which vary by eligibility criteria (definitions of ‘fault’), 
compensation entitlement levels and extent of cover and how decisions are made (in 
comparison with the court system) 
Mechanism  Outcome 
Broadly defined as notions of ‘no-fault’.  
For example, in New Zealand this may result in more successful 
claims of lower amounts, and more narrow definitions of ‘no-
fault’, whereas in France, it may result in fewer claims of 
larger amounts. The most severe disability only is compensated 
in France. Thus the compensation scheme in France may 
adequately care for long-term disability whilst in New Zealand, 
short-term care may be achieved.  
Reduction in short- and long-
term poverty due to caring for 
a disabled child 
Economic damages, given for lost wages and medical expenses 
not covered by other insurance, are lower in countries where 
other forms of social insurance exist, such as the Nordic 
countries. The expectation is that the general safety net, as 
well as the compensation scheme, will prevent families falling 
into poverty.  
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The transparency of the decision-making process, including the 
use of expertise and precedent and easily applied criteria, 
increases the perception of fairness and improves access to 
justice. 
Greater and more equitable 
access to justice 
 
If claimants have access to the courts as well as the NFCS, 
there may be lower numbers of claims using the no-fault 
scheme.  
For example, if there is no access to the courts, as in New 
Zealand and the Nordic countries, there are higher rates of 
application to the schemes, compared to France, which retains 
access to courts. 
Speedier decision making aids physical recovery, as claimants 
do not delay treatment because they are in the compensation 
process and need to show suffering and pain in order to gain 
compensation. 
Mental health and well-being 
Procedural justice, i.e. the process of decision making is 
perceived to be fair, impacts on mental health and physical 
well-being. 
 
We then read more broadly to come up with a longer list of CMOs connected to economic, 
justice and health outcomes. We shared these with the DH policy team, who were asked 
to prioritise the outcomes that they were particularly interested in exploring further. They 
asked us to focus on the justice and health outcomes, since the economic ones would 
'would be considered through detailed economic modelling. We explored these outcomes 
further through more in-depth reading and discussion. These were then expanded into the 
final list of outcomes.  
Table 6.2: Initial claimant outcomes 
Context: Compensation schemes which vary by eligibility criteria (definitions of ‘fault’), 
compensation entitlement levels and extent of cover and how decisions are made (in 
comparison with the court system) in varying jurisdictions.  
 
Prioritised outcomes in bold 
Outcome Mechanism 
ECONOMIC 1: 
Generous payouts 
Compensation entitlement levels and limitations on the extent of cover 
impact on the risk of falling into poverty since they may not be generous 
enough to take care of the child over the long term. 
ECONOMIC 2: 
economic damages 
and social welfare 
regimes 
Economic damages, given for lost wages and medical expenses not covered 
by other insurance, are lower in countries where other forms of social 
insurance exist, such as the Nordic countries. The expectation is that the 
general safety net, as well as the compensation scheme, will prevent 
families falling into poverty. 
ECONOMIC 3: Broad 
eligibility criteria 
equal many claims, 
which equal small 
payouts 
Broadly defined notions of ‘no-fault’, e.g. in New Zealand, may result in 
more successful claims of lower amounts; narrower definitions of ‘no-fault’, 
e.g. in France, result in fewer claims of larger amounts. Only the most 
severe disability is compensated in France. Thus the compensation scheme 
in France may adequately care for long-term disability, whilst in New 
Zealand, short-term care may be achieved.  
ECONOMIC 4: Return 
to work 
Compensation schemes with generous terms and broad eligibility criteria 
and a rehabilitation focus enable an earlier return to work and so make it 
less likely that families will fall into poverty. 
ECONOMIC 5: 
Earnings related 
compensation only 
No-fault compensation schemes that only pay compensation on lost 
earnings target those in the workforce. It dissuades older people, who may 
have more severe injuries, from applying. 
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JUSTICE 1: Access 
to courts 
If claimants have access to the courts as well as the NFCS, there may be 
lower numbers of claims in the no fault scheme, as in France. If there is 
no access to the courts, there are higher rates of application to the 
schemes, as in New Zealand and the Nordic countries. 
JUSTICE 2: Equality 
of access 
Compensation entitlement levels impact on access to justice if greater 
sums can be gained through access to the courts – so only those wealthy 
enough to afford a lawsuit can pursue claims that may, if successful, 
lead to higher sums. However, the no fault schemes ensure access to 
compensation no matter the income level of the applicant. 
JUSTICE 3: Patient 
groups increase the 
democratic mandate 
of decision making 
The make-up of the decision-making committees will affect access to 
justice. The presence of patient groups increases the democratic mandate 
of the committees and makes the decisions more acceptable. 
JUSTICE 4: 
Compensation 
decoupled from 
disciplinary 
procedures 
Creating a ‘Chinese wall’ between compensation procedures and 
disciplinary procedures enables speedier access to justice, since 
physicians are more ready to hand over the relevant information. 
JUSTICE 5: 
Transparency of 
decision making 
The transparency of the decision-making process, including the use of 
expertise and precedent and easily applied criteria, increases the 
perception of fairness and improves access to justice. 
JUSTICE 6: Severity 
of harm criterion 
No-fault compensation schemes with eligibility criteria relating to severity 
of harm are likely to cover all these adverse events. 
JUSTICE 7: 
Preventability 
criterion 
NFCSs with eligibility criteria based on preventability criteria, as in the 
Nordic schemes, tap into patient dissatisfaction and identify nearly all 
events that have system-related aetiologies. 
JUSTICE 8: Cerebral 
palsy 
Cerebral palsy is the only birth outcome associated with malpractice (other 
than death). Therefore, an NFCS that covered this injury comprehensively 
would ensure access to justice for all. 
HEALTH 1: 
Generous pay-outs 
to increase security 
Compensation entitlement levels that are generous improve the mental 
health of recipients, since they are reassured that they are not at risk of 
falling into poverty. 
HEALTH 2: 
Improved access 
limiting anxiety 
Broad eligibility criteria improve access to justice and remove the 
anxieties of fighting a court case, and thus improve mental health and 
well-being. 
HEALTH 3: Speedy 
decision making 
Speedier decision making improves well-being, as it means that the money 
is released earlier and there are fewer anxieties about court cases. 
HEALTH 4: 
Procedural justice 
Procedural justice, i.e. the process of decision making is perceived to be 
fair, impacts on mental health and physical well-being. 
HEALTH 5: Speedy 
decision making aids 
physical recovery 
Speedier decision making aids physical recovery as claimants do not delay 
treatment because they are in the compensation process and need to show 
suffering and pain in order to gain compensation. 
HEALTH 6: 
Improves physical 
outcomes 
NFCSs improve physical outcomes. 
HEALTH 7: Limited 
choices 
Limited choices in what services can be provided under an NFCS improve 
information about what is available and appropriate, and reduce anxieties 
associated with choice. 
HEALTH 8: No need 
to prove injury aids 
recovery 
The universality and absence of need to prove injury and disability to 
obtain compensation also favour a positive environment for functional 
recovery. 
HEALTH 9: 
Rehabilitation focus 
aids return to work 
No-fault compensation schemes, with additional support workers to 
promote return to economic life, aid recovery.  
In the final list, the prioritised CMOs were adjusted and the explanations sharpened, and 
the remainder were either subsumed into or discussed under the final configurations. 
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Table 6.3 indicates how these initial CMOs were reorganised under the final 
configurations.  
Table 6.3: Final CMOs with contributions from initial CMOs (Subsumed CMOs are in italics)  
Outcome Mechanism 
JUSTICE 1: Access to 
Court 
To ensure that compensation schemes remain attractive to claimants, 
they must offer payments comparable to damages awarded through 
litigation, and broader eligibility criteria, to ensure that they are 
more appealing than the tort-based system.  
JUSTICE 2: Equality of 
Access 
 
NFCSs that are free to access improve justice outcomes in that they 
are accessible to all eligible parties, unlike the tort system, which 
favours those who can afford legal representation.  
JUSTICE 3: Transparency 
of process 
 
Transparency of process achieves justice through the representation 
of the claimant, and mechanisms that improve the consistency of 
decision making through the use of medical experts and the 
consideration of precedents. 
The initial CMO: ‘JUSTICE 3: Patient groups increase democratic 
mandate of decision making’ was discussed under this CMO 
JUSTICE 4: 
Compensation processes 
decoupled from 
compensation 
procedures 
Creating a ‘Chinese wall’ between compensation procedures and 
disciplinary procedures enables improved access to justice and a more 
efficient compensation scheme, since physicians are more ready to 
hand over the relevant information. 
JUSTICE 5: Severity of 
harm criterion 
This criterion was discussed under JUSTICE 1. 
JUSTICE 6: 
Preventability criterion 
The notion of preventability was picked up in the Patient Safety 
outcomes, which discussed admitting and learning from error. 
JUSTICE 7: Cerebral 
palsy 
The issues concerning adjudications around cerebral palsy and the 
need for medical experts were discussed under JUSTICE 3. 
HEALTH 1: Physical 
Health 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the physical health of patients by 
shortening the length of time to claim closure and by including a 
rehabilitative element in the award.  
This was developed from HEALTH 6. 
HEALTH 2: Mental 
Health 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the mental health of patients by 
shortening the length of time to claim closure and by removing the 
adversarial element of the tort system. 
HEALTH 1 and 2 were combined to form this CMO. 
HEALTH 3: Speedy 
decision making 
This theme, as it effects mental health, was discussed in HEALTH 2. 
 
HEALTH 4: Procedural 
justice 
This was discussed under JUSTICE 3 and HEALTH 2. 
HEALTH 5: speedy 
decision making aids 
physical recovery 
This was discussed under HEALTH 1. 
HEALTH 6 Limited 
choices 
This was discussed under HEALTH 2. 
HEALTH 8: No need to 
prove injury aids 
recovery 
This was discussed under HEALTH 2. 
HEALTH 9: 
Rehabilitation focus aids 
return to work 
This was discussed under HEALTH 1. 
 
We were also asked to consider outcomes affecting clinicians and we went through the 
same process, preparing a list of candidate CMOs and asking the policy team to prioritise. 
They identified areas of interest within these outcomes, but also wanted to know if there 
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was any information about how no-fault schemes affected the well-being of clinicians. In 
the short time available we could not find any papers about this and so wrote a short note 
about the effects of the tort system on clinicians.  
Table 6.4 sets out our initial CMOs regarding clinical practice and patient safety and table 
6 shows how these initial CMOs were discussed under the final three configurations that 
were developed.  
Table 6.4: Clinician outcomes – initial CMOs 
Outcome Mechanism 
CLINICAL PRACTICE 1: 
Caps on damages enable 
riskier treatments 
Caps on non-economic damages (pain and suffering) lead to 
treatments with higher risk and also higher survival rates (e.g. 
bladder cancer). The higher survival rates are due to more 
experienced care after the risky surgery.  
CLINICAL PRACTICE 2: 
No-fault schemes lower 
health costs 
No fault schemes, where there is no personal liability for the doctor, 
reduce the need for defensive medicine in terms of precautionary 
procedures, and so lower health treatment costs. 
CLINICAL PRACTICE 3: 
Caps on damages affect 
referral rates 
Caps on non economic damages lower referral rates received by 
specialist doctors. 
CLINICAL PRACTICE 4: 
Reductions in liability do 
not affect birth 
outcomes 
The impact of liability pressure on obstetric practice comes largely in 
the form of defensive medicine. The rise in Caesarean sections and 
the dip in vaginal births after Caesareans induced by liability 
pressures (Yang et al. 2009) cannot be justified on clinical grounds, 
and the liability pressures produce patterns of precaution taking in 
obstetrics that do not lead to superior birth outcomes. 
PATIENT SAFETY 1: 
Admitting to error 
Removing the stigma associated with negligence investigations and 
findings could make providers more comfortable discussing and 
admitting errors, in turn supporting learning and prevention. 
PATIENT SAFETY 2: 
Learning from error 
Evidence suggests that system administrators make good use of their 
databases to identify safety problems and that they disseminate 
lessons learned nationally. 
PATIENT SAFETY 3: 
Physicians more likely to 
disclose 
In a no-fault system where there is no personal liability, physicians 
are more likely to disclose iatrogenic injury.  
PATIENT SAFETY 4: 
Process is about patient 
safety rather than risk 
management 
By avoiding the litigation process where negligence is identified, the 
no-fault compensation scheme enables a greater focus on patient 
safety rather than risk management. A system involving lawyers 
implies a risk management strategy which puts barriers in the way of 
patient safety. 
PATIENT SAFETY 5: 
Avoidability standard 
preferable to negligence 
standard 
The avoidability standard removes the taint of negligence, and 
therefore makes it more likely that doctors will disclose injuries. 
 
In the final three CMOs, all of the Clinical Practice CMOs were collapsed into the CMO 
labelled ‘Defensive medicine’ and the first two Patient Safety CMOs incorporated the last 
three CMOs in this group. 
Table 6.5: Outcomes for clinicians: Final CMOs (The subsumed CMS are in italic)  
Outcome Mechanism 
CLINICAL PRACTICE: Defensive 
medicine 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests and procedures and 
improve access to health care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians because doctors are less likely to practise positive and/or 
negative defensive medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
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All four of the initial CMOs in this section were collapsed into this one 
overarching CMO. 
PATIENT SAFETY 1: Admitting 
to error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling physicians to disclose 
iatrogenic injury through the removal of personal liability, applying the 
avoidability criterion and decoupling compensation from disciplinary 
procedures. 
PATIENT SAFETY 2: Learning 
from error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling the pooling and sharing of 
information about medical errors and by reframing the compensation 
process as a patient safety strategy rather than a risk management 
strategy. 
PATIENT SAFETY 3: Physicians 
more likely to disclose 
This was discussed under PATIENT SAFETY 1. 
PATIENT SAFETY 4: Process 
about patient safety rather 
than risk management 
This was discussed under PATIENT SAFETY 2. 
PATIENT SAFETY 5: 
Avoidability standard is 
preferable to negligence 
standard 
This was discussed under PATIENT SAFETY 1. 
 
6.4 Stage 2: Identification and retrieval of studies  
6.4.1 Initial searching  
To inform this review, an initial scoping exercise was undertaken in December 2015 (see 
appendix 2), in which Google Scholar was searched and key policy contacts provided 
literature on birth trauma and other international and UK-based compensation schemes 
for obstetrics and other types of medical injury. The initial identification of information 
helped to describe the characteristics of international no-fault injury compensation 
schemes and informed the conceptual framework, the development and refinement of the 
scope of the review and the review question outlined in Chapter 1. A further search for 
evidence was also undertaken covering the last 10 years in two key databases (see Section 
6.4.2).  
6.4.2 Further iterative searches  
The literature search was iterative and ongoing throughout the review. To identify papers 
examining mechanisms influencing outcomes and the uptake of compensation schemes, a 
search was conducted on two academic databases MEDLINE and CINAHL, in January 2016. 
The terms used were ‘compensation schemes’ OR key terms related to compensation 
schemes identified from the initial scoping in phase 1, combined with concepts related to 
factors, barriers, facilitators and uptake. Searches were limited to the last ten years and 
the English language. Located citations were uploaded into EPPI-Reviewer, a custom 
research software, for management of publication retrieval, coding and synthesis (Thomas 
et al. 2010). We used the data-mining and independent search functions of EPPI-Reviewer 
to identify relevant papers. Single and combined terms used included, but were not 
limited to: ‘compensation scheme’; ‘no-fault’, ‘birth injury’, ‘early resolution’, tort 
reform. These searches were subject to screening against the inclusion criteria.  
Overall, we sought reviews of policies introducing or commenting on NFCSs as a way of 
generating CMOs and of finding papers with empirical material that could support these 
CMOs. This search was supplemented by applying the same approach to Google Scholar. 
After further discussion with the DH in February 2016, further searches were carried out to 
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find additional articles capturing clinical outcomes. In addition, reference list checks and 
forward citation chasing were also undertaken to identify any other relevant literature. 
The discussions with the policy team enabled more limited searches as we focused on the 
areas of interest. For example, the term ‘defensive medicine’ only emerged after papers 
were sought that identified the effects of compensation schemes on clinical practice. This 
term was not used in the earlier scoping searches, partly because our initial focus was on 
patient outcomes.  
6.4.3 Selection of studies for inclusion in the review  
We allowed refinement of the inclusion criteria to occur at any point during the review 
process in line with a realist approach, as this could reflect a greater understanding of the 
type of evidence most relevant to answering the review questions, or new conceptual and 
theoretical developments arising from the initial scoping in phase 1. In the case of this 
review, after discussion with policy makers, the criteria were expanded to include 
outcomes relevant to both patients and doctors. To be eligible for inclusion in this review, 
papers needed to do the following: 
 Focus on an NFCS, relevant to potentially iatrogenic injuries in children occurring at birth 
or in the early years (under five years of age), or which have two of the three 
characteristics similar to birth trauma compensation schemes, including those that: are 
high-value claims, have high long-term costs, are highly emotive.  
These were an important guide initially, but we found that papers did not make these 
kinds of judgements about the injuries suffered by claimants. So we used papers that 
attempted to show the effects of compensation processes on victims whatever their 
injury, but prioritised papers that discussed birth injury and iatrogenic injury.  
 Examine contextual factors influencing the delivery mechanisms of schemes that could 
contribute to uptake and/or contribute to our understanding of the CMOs, i.e. contain 
information about the effects of compensation schemes on economic, access to justice 
and health outcomes for victims and/or patients. 
This became the most important inclusion criteria. To be included, the papers had to tell 
us something about variations to the tort system that impacted on patients and/or 
doctors. Following discussion with the DH policy team we de-prioritised material 
pertaining to economic outcomes, which was considered elsewhere. 
 Be published within the past ten years.  
This timescale identified literature most relevant to the UK context since the introduction 
of both the Making Amends report and the NHS Redress Act 2006, both of which dealt with 
medical liability reform (Department of Health 2003; UK Parliament 2006). 
We expanded this timeframe if papers contained relevant information that added to our 
understanding of the CMOs. However, the basic search strategy meant that such material 
was less likely to be identified. 
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6.5 Stage 3: Coding and analysis  
6.5.1 Data extraction  
Descriptive characteristics were extracted from the studies. Specifically, what type of 
NFCS and country the study investigated and whether the injury was medical or non-
medical. Further empirical and descriptive information from the studies was extracted, 
drawing on the initial conceptual framework outlined in Section 6.3. Newly identified 
concepts were added to this framework as they appeared in the literature (see Appendix 2 
for the coding tool).  
6.5.2 Appraisal of relevance  
Papers were critically appraised as their concepts were integrated into the initial 
framework. A common approach to quality appraisal in systematic reviews is to assess bias 
or rigour according to key dimensions of the design and execution of the study, and thus is 
undertaken prior to the synthesis. Quality appraisal in realist reviews is not solely based 
on methodological quality; it also relates to the relevance of the material for elucidating 
CMOs. The criteria for quality becomes whether the paper fits the needs of the review and 
the richness of the material found within the paper. As this review was only developing 
the CMOs, not testing them, studies were judged based on their relevance only.  
We developed specific criteria to assess the relevance of papers to answer the review 
questions. First, we made an assessment of whether the paper sought to investigate, 
explore or describe the implementation or introduction of no-fault compensations schemes 
for birth injury, medical injury or other types of injuries (e.g. workplace or road traffic 
accidents). Second, we assessed whether the paper provided information or empirical 
evidence on uptake or on any one of the CMOs, e.g. sufficient explanation of why 
compensation schemes, or their different mechanisms, led to particular outcomes.  
Based on answers to these questions, an overall judgement of high, medium or low 
relevance was made. Evidence was considered to be of high relevance when providing 
empirical evidence on birth-related injuries, medium relevance when related to 
compensation for other medical related injuries and low relevance when the focus was not 
medically related or when speculations from the authors were unsupported by empirical 
evidence. Overall, speculations alone were not included in the syntheses as they were 
judged not to be evidenced (O’Campo et al. 2015), such that we excluded opinion pieces, 
editorials and commentary.  
6.5.3 Development of CMO configurations  
Empirical and descriptive data from studies on the way different factors appeared to 
affect uptake and engagement in NFCSs and the manner in which they operated were 
combined from individual studies (Oliver et al. 2008; Thomas et al. 2012) to inform the 
development of context-mechanism-outcome configurations and explanatory accounts to 
support them. Our initial work focused on refining the CMOs so that they were as 
practically specific as they could be. This was made possible through reflective discussion 
between two reviewers (KD and KH) to consider the empirical and descriptive data 
extracted and whether they supported the CMOs, and where refinements and adjustments 
needed to be made. Evidence to provide the narrative justification of the preliminary 
theoretic CMO configurations was identified from the findings, authors’ descriptions of 
findings and their conclusions. This write-up of the studies against these CMOs aimed to 
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clarify and substantiate our thinking about why we had structured the CMO in this way and 
to justify the configurations as they are presented in the report. We aimed to ensure that 
each CMO configuration began with the way differences in compensation schemes across 
social jurisdictions (context) might trigger or shape engagement or practice (mechanisms) 
and affect patients and clinicians (outcomes). Although using EPPI-Reviewer allowed us to 
maintain a record of initial CMOs and produce evidence tables and supporting evidence 
that could be shared between reviewers, and although in some cases we did attempt to go 
back and record further CMOs, each iteration of the CMOs was not formally recorded.  
Overall, our analysis sought to identify and report on the way compensation schemes may 
be related to access to justice, clinical practice, patient safety and health outcomes, both 
physical and mental. We interrogated the studies to ensure that we were able to identify 
and report on the extent to which the empirical literature supports the CMOs that we had 
identified with our policy colleagues. The content and implications of the analysis for 
potential birth trauma compensation schemes will be used for the basis of team discussion 
and to inform decisions about how this review might be taken further.  
6.5.4 Quality assurance process  
This rapid realist review draws on EPPI-Centre quality assurance processes at two key 
stages in the review. At the study selection stage, reviewers discussed in detail a sub-set 
of papers potentially relevant to informing the CMO framework in terms of their richness, 
depth and level of empiricism. All papers selected for inclusion were checked by a second 
reviewer to confirm that they met the criteria for inclusion and relevance. At the analysis 
stage, reviewers independently extracted data for each potential CMO and met to discuss 
their initial ideas, refining the CMOs in light of this discussion. Further, using EPPI-
Reviewer (Thomas et al., 2010) as a database system enabled us to keep a transparent 
record of the identification and coding of studies found during the review, including any 
refinements that were introduced through the review process.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Rapid realist review checklist  
 
Section Checklist items Reported 
Title  
1  In the title, identify the document as a realist 
synthesis or review 
Title page  
Abstract 
2   While acknowledging publication requirements 
and house style, abstracts should ideally contain 
brief details of: the study's background, review 
question or objectives; search strategy; methods 
of selection, appraisal, analysis and synthesis of 
sources; main results; and implications for 
practice. 
Executive 
summary  
Introduction  
3 Rationale for 
review 
Explain why the review is needed and what it is 
likely to contribute to existing understanding of 
the topic area. 
Chapter 1  
4 Objectives and 
focus of review 
State the objective(s) of the review and/or the 
review question(s). Define and provide a rationale 
for the focus of the review. 
Chapter 1  
Methods  
5 Changes in the 
review process 
Any changes made to the review process that was 
initially planned should be briefly described and 
justified. 
Chapter 6 – 
review inclusion 
only  
6 Rationale for 
using realist 
synthesis 
Explain why realist synthesis was considered the 
most appropriate method to use. 
Chapters 1 and 2 
7 Scoping the 
literature 
Describe and justify the initial process of 
exploratory scoping of the literature. 
Chapter 6 
8 Searching 
processes 
While considering specific requirements of the 
journal or other publication outlet, state and 
provide a rationale for how the iterative searching 
was done. Provide details on all the sources 
accessed for information in the review. Where 
searching in electronic databases has taken place, 
the details should include, for example, name of 
database, search terms, dates of coverage and 
date last searched. If individuals familiar with the 
relevant literature and/or topic area were 
contacted, indicate how they were identified and 
selected. 
Chapter 2; 
Appendix 2  
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Section Checklist items Reported 
9 Selection and 
appraisal of 
documents 
Explain how judgements were made about 
including and excluding data from documents, 
and justify these. 
Chapter 6  
10 Data extraction Describe and explain which data or information 
were extracted from the included documents and 
justify this selection. 
Chapter 6  
11 Analysis and 
synthesis 
processes 
Describe the analysis and synthesis processes in 
detail. This section should include information on 
the constructs analysed and describe the analytic 
process. 
Chapter 6  
Results  
12 Document flow 
diagram 
Provide details on the number of documents 
assessed for eligibility and included in the review 
with reasons for exclusion at each stage as well as 
an indication of their source of origin (for 
example, from searching databases, reference 
lists and so on). You may consider using the 
example templates (which are likely to need 
modification to suit the data) that are provided. 
N/A – only 
conducting first 
part of realist 
review in a rapid 
time frame.  
13 Document 
characteristics 
Provide information on the characteristics of the 
documents included in the review. 
Appendix 3  
14 Main findings Present the key findings with a specific focus on 
theory building and testing. 
Chapter 3 
Discussion  
15 Summary of 
findings 
Summarise the main findings, taking into account 
the review's objective(s), research question(s), 
focus and intended audience(s). 
Chapter 4  
16 Strengths, 
limitations and 
future research 
directions 
Discuss both the strengths of the review and its 
limitations. These should include (but need not be 
restricted to) (a) consideration of all the steps in 
the review process and (b) comment on the 
overall strength of evidence supporting the 
explanatory insights which emerged. 
The limitations identified may point to areas 
where further work is needed. 
Chapter 4  
17 Comparison 
with existing 
literature 
Where applicable, compare and contrast the 
review's findings with the existing literature (for 
example, other reviews) on the same topic. 
N/A – only 
conducting first 
part of realist 
review in a rapid 
time frame. 
18 Conclusion and 
recommendatio
ns 
List the main implications of the findings and 
place these in the context of other relevant 
literature. If appropriate, offer recommendations 
for policy and practice. 
Chapter 4 – 
partially as only 
conducting first 
part of review  
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Section Checklist items Reported 
19 Funding Provide details of funding source (if any) for the 
review, the role played by the funder (if any) and 
any conflicts of interests of the reviewers. 
Title pages  
 
Note: adapted from Wong et al. (2013)  
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Appendix 2: Methods  
Initial scoping search strategy  
 
Search strategy for Medline via OVID, run 18 December 2015.  
Systematic review terms: (S1)  
NFCS terms (S3-9)  
Date limit of 2005-2015 (S2, S10). 
 
Searches Results Hits 
1 "systematic review".kw. or meta-analysis.pt. or meta-analysis.ti. or meta-analysis.ab. or 
meta-analy*.tw. or "systematic literature review".ti. or "systematic literature review".ab. 
or review.pt. or "meta synthesis".ti. or "meta synthesis".ab. or "integrative review".tw. or 
"integrative research review".tw. or "rapid review".tw. or "evidence based".ti. or 
"evidence based".ab. or (inclusion and criteri*).tw. or exclusion criteri*.tw. or 
handsearch.tw. or research synthesis.mp. or "realist synthesis".mp. or "realist 
review".mp. or "rapid realist review".mp. or "literature review".mp. or "narrative 
review".mp. or meta-ethnograph*.mp. or "narrative review".mp. or "narrative 
synthesis".mp. or "critical interpretive synthesis".mp. or "rapid review".mp. or "scoping 
review".mp. or "evidence synthesis".mp. or "research syntheses".mp. or "evidence 
review".mp. or "evidence map*".mp. or "systematic map*".mp. 
2,266,105 
2 limit 1 to yr="2005 -Current" 1,114,581 
3 compensation.mp. or "Compensation and Redress"/ 45,170 
4 birth trauma.mp. or Birth Injuries/ 5,208 
5 (malpractice adj6 Obstetric*).af. 803 
6 (payment adj6 Obstetric*).af. 16 
7 (Litigation adj6 Obstetric*).af. 73 
8 (scheme adj6 Obstetric).af. 11 
9 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 51,123 
10 limit 9 to yr="2005 -Current" 21,362 
11 2 and 10 2,170 
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Coding tool  
 
Type of study  
CMO paper 
Empirical data  
No data 
paper has been checked but no data to support CMO or to suggest a new CMO 
 
Type of outcomes (tick all that apply)  
JUSTICE 1: Access to courts  
If claimants have access to the courts as well as the NFCS, there may be lower amounts 
of claims on the no-fault scheme as in France. If there is no access to the courts, there 
are higher rates of application to the schemes as in New Zealand and the Nordic 
countries (Barbot et al. 2014). 
JUSTICE 2: Equality of access  
Compensation entitlement levels impact on access to justice if greater sums can be 
gained through access to the courts – so only those wealthy enough to afford a lawsuit 
can pursue claims that may, if successful, lead to higher sums. However, the no-fault 
schemes ensure access to compensation no matter the income level of the applicant.  
JUSTICE 3: Compensation decoupled from disciplinary procedures 
Creating a Chinese wall between compensation procedures and disciplinary procedures 
enables speedier access to justice, since physicians are more ready to hand over the 
relevant information (Kachalia et al. 2008). 
JUSTICE 4: Transparency of decision making 
The transparency of the decision making process, including the use of expertise and 
precedent and easily applied criteria, increases the perception of fairness and improves 
access to justice.  
CLINICAL PRACTICE: Defensive medicine  
PATIENT SAFETY 1: Admitting to error 
Anything that supports doctors to disclose injury or not; not individual liability but 
organisational/enterprise liability. Removing the stigma associated with negligence 
investigations and findings could make providers more comfortable discussing and 
admitting errors, in turn supporting learning and prevention. 
PATIENT SAFETY 2: Learning from error 
Anything that supports learning from error; databases capturing details of claims. 
Their effects on patient safety have not been systematically measured, but evidence 
suggests that system administrators make good use of their databases to identify safety 
problems and that they disseminate lessons learned nationally.  
HEALTH 1: Improves physical health outcomes 
NFCSs improve physical health outcomes.  
HEALTH 2: Improves mental health outcomes 
NFCSs improve mental health outcomes.  
About birth 
Anything relating to birth and compensation schemes. 
 
Context: Type of compensation scheme / Focus of study 
Details  
 
Type of injury  
Medical  
Non-medical 
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Appendix 3: Further details of papers included in the review  
Brief overview of studies 
We developed the CMO framework by drawing on 44 papers, the majority of which were 
empirical studies (N=33). We specifically sought to identify papers pertaining to NFCSs for 
people who had experienced a birth-related injury. However, we found that the majority 
of studies on compensation schemes and tort reform focused primarily on medical injury 
(n=34) with only seven of these specifically related to the birth process. We included a 
further 10 studies on compensation schemes for people who had suffered injuries as a 
result of a transport-related or workplace accidents.  
Figure A3.1: Injury focus  
 
For the purposes of this realist review, context specifically relates to different 
compensation schemes or issues pertaining to tort reform in relation to the introduction of 
compensation schemes. A breakdown of the type and social and political systems within 
which schemes operate is provided in Figure A3.2. The 14 papers from New Zealand on 
NFCSs reflect the focus of this review and our search efforts. A further 11 papers focus on 
the USA and tort reform, specifically in relation to clinical practice outcomes and reducing 
defensive practice. We also identified papers on compensation schemes in Australia (n=7), 
the USA (n=6) and the Nordic countries (n=6). Few studies were identified from the UK 
(n=2) and France, although the latter might reflect an English language bias in the search.  
Figure A3.2: Context  
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Appendix 3 
70 
 
Note: Figures add up to more than 44 because some papers relate to more than one 
context. 
Relevance appraisal  
Judgements made about the relevance of the 44 papers included in the CMO 
configurations were assessed using the approach described in Chapter 6. The majority of 
papers (n=27) identified CMO configurations in relation to medical injury, and were 
therefore judged as of medium relevance. Only seven papers were specifically about 
compensating injury occurring during birth and were judged as of high relevance. The 
remaining ten studies were judged as low relevance (See Table A3.1), they were not 
excluded from the findings but are clearly signposted in the CMO framework to indicate 
their provisional usefulness to answering the review questions.  
Table A3.3: Relevance judgements  
 
Study 
relevance  
N Papers included in the CMO framework  
 
High  7 Cheng et al. (2014); Dubay et al. (2001); Robertson and Thomson (2014); 
Sakala et al. (2013); Siegal et al. (2008); Yang et al. (2009); Yang et al. 
(2012) 
 
Medium  29 Barbot et al. (2014); Bismark et al. (2006a); Bismark et al. (2006b); 
Bismark and Paterson (2006); Davis et al. (2002) Hugman (2007); Hyman et 
al. (2010); Jarvelin et al. (2012); Jena et al. (2015); Jonsson and Øvretveit 
(2008); Kachalia et al. (2008); Kachalia et al. (2016); Kessler (n.d.); Keren-
Paz (2010); Malcolm and Barnett (2007); Mello et al. (2006); Mello et al. 
(2011); Murtagh et al. (2012); Montanera (2016); Pukk-Härenstam et al. 
(2008); Shurtz (2013); Sobrun-Maharaj et al. (2010); Vandersteegen et al. 
(2015); Wallis (2013); Wallis (2015); Wallis and Dovey (2011); Xu et al. 
(2013) 
 
Low 8 Armstrong and Tess (2008); Cameron et al. (2008); Elbers et al (2013); 
Gabbe et al. (2007); Grant et al. (2014); Harrington (2015); Manson et al. 
(2015); Montgomery et al. (2015); Murgatroyd et al. (2015); Sterling et al. 
(2010);  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Characteristics of papers  
Table A3.4: Characteristics of papers included in the CMO Framework  
Study Injury focus Context  Outcomes Mechanism Publication 
type and 
relevance 
Armstrong and 
Tess (2008)  
Non-medical 
Work injury 
schemes 
 
USA: Early-
disclosure and 
resolution schemes 
New Zealand: No-
blame compensation 
schemes 
Australia: Fault/no-
fault schemes 
Justice 2: 
Equality of access  
NFCSs that are free to access improve justice 
outcomes in that they are accessible to all 
eligible parties, unlike the tort system which 
favours those who can afford legal representation.  
Publication 
type: Non-
systematic 
review  
Relevance: 
Low  
Barbot et al. 
(2014)  
Medical  
 
France: Fault/no-
fault schemes  
 
Justice 1: Access 
to courts  
To make compensation schemes attractive to 
claimants, they must offer payment and 
broader eligibility criteria, to ensure 
schemes remain more appealing than the tort-
based system. 
Publication 
type: Policy 
review  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Justice 2: 
Equality of access 
NFCSs that are free to access improve justice 
outcomes in that they are accessible to all 
eligible parties, unlike the tort system, which 
favours those who can afford legal representation.  
Justice 3: 
Transparency of 
process 
 
Transparency of process achieves justice through 
the representation of the claimant, and 
mechanisms that improve the consistency of 
decision making through the use of medical 
experts and the consideration of precedents. 
  
Study Injury focus Context  Outcomes Mechanism Publication 
type and 
relevance 
Bismark et al. 
(2006a)  
 
Medical  
 
New Zealand: No-
blame 
compensation 
schemes 
 
Justice 2: 
Equality of access 
 
 
NFCSs that are free to access improve justice 
outcomes in that they are accessible to all 
eligible parties, unlike the tort system which 
favours those who can afford legal representation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Justice 4: 
Compensation 
decoupled from 
disciplinary 
procedures 
Creating a ‘Chinese wall’ between 
compensation procedures and disciplinary 
procedures enables improved access to justice 
and a more efficient compensation scheme, since 
physicians are more ready to hand over the 
relevant information. 
Bismark et al. 
(2006b)  
 
Medical 
 
 
 
 
 
New Zealand: No-
blame 
compensation 
schemes 
 
 
Justice 2: 
Equality of access 
NFCSs that are free to access improve justice 
outcomes in that they are accessible to all 
eligible parties, unlike the tort system which 
favours those who can afford legal representation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium 
Bismark and 
Paterson (2006)  
 
Medical  
 
New Zealand: No-
blame 
compensation 
schemes 
 
Patient safety 1: 
Admitting to error 
 
 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling 
physicians to disclose iatrogenic injury through 
the removal of personal liability, applying the 
avoidability criterion and decoupling 
compensation from disciplinary procedures. 
Publication 
type: Policy 
review  
Relevance: 
Medium:  
 Patient safety 2: 
Learning from 
error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling the 
pooling and sharing of information about 
medical errors and by reframing the 
compensation process as a patient safety 
strategy rather than a risk management 
strategy. 
  
Study Injury focus Context  Outcomes Mechanism Publication 
type and 
relevance 
Cameron et al. 
(2008)  
 
Non-medical 
Traffic 
accidents  
Australia: 
Fault/no-fault 
schemes 
 
Health 1: Physical 
health 
 
 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the physical health 
of patients by shortening the length of time to 
claim closure and by including a rehabilitative 
element in the award.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Low 
Cheng et al. 
(2014)  
Medical  
Birth-related  
USA: Tort reform 
only 
 
 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine  
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
High  
Davis et al. (2002)  Medical  
 
New Zealand: No-
blame 
compensation 
schemes 
Justice 2: 
Equality of access 
 
 
 NFCSs that are free to access improve justice 
outcomes in that they are accessible to all 
eligible parties, unlike the tort system, which 
favours those who can afford legal representation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium 
Dubay et al. 
(2001)  
Medical  
Birth-related  
USA: Tort reform 
only 
 
 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine 
 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
High  
Elbers et al (2013)  Non-medical  
Traffic 
accidents  
 
Netherlands: 
Avoidable standard 
/ unavoidable 
injuries 
 
 
Justice 3: 
Transparency of 
process 
 
 
Transparency of process achieves justice through 
the representation of the claimant, and 
mechanisms that improve the consistency of 
decision making through the use of medical 
experts and the consideration of precedents. 
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Low  
  
Study Injury focus Context  Outcomes Mechanism Publication 
type and 
relevance 
Gabbe et al. 
(2007)  
Non-medical  
Transport-
related 
injuries  
Australia: 
Fault/no-fault 
schemes 
Health 2: Mental 
health 
 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the mental health 
of patients by shortening the length of time to 
claim closure and by removing the adversarial 
element of the tort system. 
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Low  
Grant et al. (2014)  Non-medical 
Transport 
and 
workplace 
injuries  
 
Australia: 
Fault/no-fault 
schemes 
 
Health 2: Mental 
health 
 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the mental health 
of patients by shortening the length of time to 
claim closure and by removing the adversarial 
element of the tort system. 
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Low  
Harrington (2015)  Non-medical 
Transport 
accidents  
Australia: 
Fault/no-fault 
schemes 
 
Health 1: Physical 
health 
 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the physical health 
of patients by shortening the length of time to 
claim closure and by including a rehabilitative 
element in the award.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Low  
Health 2: Mental 
health 
 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the mental health 
of patients by shortening the length of time to 
claim closure and by removing the adversarial 
element of the tort system. 
Hugman (2007)  Medical  
 
USA: Tort reform 
only 
 
 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine  
 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Publication 
type: Policy 
review  
Relevance: 
Medium  
  
Study Injury focus Context  Outcomes Mechanism Publication 
type and 
relevance 
Hyman et al. 
(2010)  
Medical  
 
USA: Tort reform 
only 
 
Patient safety 2: 
Learning from 
error 
 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling the 
pooling and sharing of information about 
medical errors and by reframing the 
compensation process as a patient safety 
strategy rather than a risk management 
strategy. 
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Jarvelin et al. 
(2012)  
Medical  
 
Nordic countries: 
Avoidable standard 
/ unavoidable 
injuries 
 
Justice 2: 
Equality of access 
 
 
NFCSs that are free to access improve justice 
outcomes in that they are accessible to all 
eligible parties, unlike the tort system which 
favours those who can afford legal representation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Jena et al. (2015)  Medical  
 
USA: Tort reform 
only 
 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Jonsson and 
Øvretveit (2008)  
Medical  
 
Nordic countries: 
Avoidable standard 
/ unavoidable 
injuries 
Sweden 
 
Patient safety 2: 
Learning from 
error 
 
 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling the 
pooling and sharing of information about 
medical errors and by reframing the 
compensation process as a patient safety 
strategy rather than a risk management 
strategy. 
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Kachalia et al. 
(2008)  
Medical  
 
Nordic countries: 
Avoidable standard 
Justice 1: Access 
to courts 
 
To make compensation schemes attractive to 
claimants, they must offer payment and 
broader eligibility criteria, to ensure 
Publication 
type: Policy 
review  
  
Study Injury focus Context  Outcomes Mechanism Publication 
type and 
relevance 
/ unavoidable 
injuries 
New Zealand: No-
blame 
compensation 
schemes 
International: 
Tort/litigation 
 
schemes remain more appealing than the tort-
based system.   
Relevance: 
Medium  
Justice 2: 
Equality of access 
 
NFCSs that are free to access improve justice 
outcomes in that they are accessible to all 
eligible parties, unlike the tort system, which 
favours those who can afford legal 
representation.  
Justice 3: 
Transparency of 
process 
 
 
Transparency of process achieves justice 
through the representation of the claimant, 
and mechanisms that improve the consistency 
of decision making through the use of 
medical experts and the consideration of 
precedents. 
Kachalia et al. 
(2016)  
Medical  
 
USA: Early-
disclosure and 
resolution schemes  
Patient safety 1: 
Admitting to error  
 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling 
physicians to disclose iatrogenic injury through 
the removal of personal liability, applying the 
avoidability criterion and decoupling 
compensation from disciplinary procedures. 
Publication 
type: Policy 
review  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Patient safety 2: 
Learning from 
error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling the 
pooling and sharing of information about 
medical errors and by reframing the 
compensation process as a patient safety 
strategy rather than a risk management 
strategy. 
  
Study Injury focus Context  Outcomes Mechanism Publication 
type and 
relevance 
Keren-Paz (2010)  Medical  
 
UK: Tort reform 
only 
 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine 
 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Publication 
type: Policy 
review  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Kessler (n.d.)  Medical  
 
USA: Tort reform 
only 
 
 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine  
 
 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Malcolm and 
Barnett (2007)  
Medical  
 
New Zealand: No-
blame 
compensation 
schemes 
Justice 4: 
Compensation 
decoupled from 
disciplinary 
procedures 
Creating a ‘Chinese wall’ between 
compensation procedures and disciplinary 
procedures enables improved access to justice 
and a more efficient compensation scheme, since 
physicians are more ready to hand over the 
relevant information. 
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Manson et al. 
(2015)  
Non-medical 
Work injuries  
 
New Zealand: No-
blame 
compensation 
schemes 
 
Health 1: Physical 
Health 
 
 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the physical health 
of patients by shortening the length of time to 
claim closure and by including a rehabilitative 
element in the award.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Low  
Mello et al. (2006)  Medical  
 
USA: Early-
disclosure and 
resolution schemes 
 
 
Patient safety 1: 
Admitting to error  
 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling 
physicians to disclose iatrogenic injury through 
the removal of personal liability, applying the 
avoidability criterion and decoupling 
compensation from disciplinary procedures. 
Publication 
type: Policy 
review  
Relevance: 
Medium  
  
Study Injury focus Context  Outcomes Mechanism Publication 
type and 
relevance 
Patient safety 2: 
Learning from 
error 
 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling the 
pooling and sharing of information about 
medical errors and by reframing the 
compensation process as a patient safety 
strategy rather than a risk management 
strategy. 
Mello et al. (2011)  Medical  
 
USA: Early-
disclosure and 
resolution schemes 
 
 
Justice 4: 
Compensation 
decoupled from 
disciplinary 
procedures 
Creating a ‘Chinese wall’ between 
compensation procedures and disciplinary 
procedures enables improved access to justice 
and a more efficient compensation scheme, since 
physicians are more ready to hand over the 
relevant information. 
Publication 
type: Policy 
review  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Montanera (2016)  Medical  
 
International: 
Tort/litigation 
 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine 
 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Montgomery et al. 
(2015)  
Non-medical 
Work injuries  
 
New Zealand: No-
blame 
compensation 
schemes 
Health 1: Physical 
health 
 
 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the physical health 
of patients by shortening the length of time to 
claim closure and by including a rehabilitative 
element in the award.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Low  
Murgatroyd et al. 
(2015)  
Non-medical  
Motor 
vehicle 
accidents  
Australia: 
Fault/no-fault 
schemes 
Health 1: Physical 
health 
 
 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the physical health 
of patients by shortening the length of time to 
claim closure and by including a rehabilitative 
element in the award.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Low 
  
Study Injury focus Context  Outcomes Mechanism Publication 
type and 
relevance 
Murtagh et al. 
(2012)  
Medical  
 
USA: Early-
disclosure and 
resolution schemes 
 
 
Justice 3: 
Transparency of 
process 
 
Transparency of process achieves justice through 
the representation of the claimant, and 
mechanisms that improve the consistency of 
decision making through the use of medical 
experts and the consideration of precedents. 
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Pukk-Härenstam 
et al. (2008) 
Medical  
 
Nordic countries: 
Avoidable 
standard/ 
unavoidable 
injuries 
Sweden 
 
Patient safety 2: 
Learning from 
error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling the 
pooling and sharing of information about 
medical errors and by reframing the 
compensation process as a patient safety 
strategy rather than a risk management 
strategy. 
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Robertson and 
Thomson (2014)  
Medical  
Birth-related  
 
UK: Tort reform 
only 
 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine 
 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
High  
Sakala et al. 
(2013)  
Medical  
Birth-related  
USA: Tort reform 
only 
 
 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine 
 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Publication 
type: Policy 
review  
Relevance: 
High  
  
Study Injury focus Context  Outcomes Mechanism Publication 
type and 
relevance 
Shurtz (2013)  Medical  
 
USA: Tort reform 
only 
 
 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine 
 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Siegal et al. (2008)  Medical 
Birth-related  
 
USA: Early-
disclosure and 
resolution schemes 
 
Justice 1: Access 
to courts 
 
 
To make compensation schemes attractive to 
claimants, they must offer payment and 
broader eligibility criteria, to ensure 
schemes remain more appealing than the tort-
based system.    
Publication 
type: Policy 
review  
Relevance: 
High  
Justice 2: 
Equality of access 
NFCSs that are free to access improve justice 
outcomes in that they are accessible to all 
eligible parties, unlike the tort system which 
favours those who can afford legal representation.  
Justice 3: 
Transparency of 
process 
 
Transparency of process achieves justice through 
the representation of the claimant, and 
mechanisms that improve the consistency of 
decision making through the use of medical 
experts and the consideration of precedents. 
Sobrun-Maharaj et 
al. (2010)  
Medical  
 
New Zealand: No-
blame 
compensation 
schemes 
Justice 2: 
Equality of access  
NFCSs that are free to access improve justice 
outcomes in that they are accessible to all 
eligible parties, unlike the tort system, which 
favours those who can afford legal representation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Sterling et al. 
(2010)  
Non-medical Australia: 
Fault/no-fault 
Health 1: Physical 
Health 
NFCSs and tort reform improve the physical health 
of patients by shortening the length of time to 
Publication 
type: 
  
Study Injury focus Context  Outcomes Mechanism Publication 
type and 
relevance 
Traffic 
accidents 
 
schemes 
 
 
 
claim closure and by including a rehabilitative 
element in the award.  
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Low 
Vandersteegen et 
al. (2015)  
Medical  
 
Nordic countries: 
avoidable standard 
/ unavoidable 
injuries 
France: Fault/no-
fault schemes  
New Zealand: No-
blame 
compensation 
schemes 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine 
 
 
 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Wallis (2013)  Medical  
 
New Zealand: No-
blame 
compensation 
schemes 
Justice 4: 
Compensation 
decoupled from 
disciplinary 
procedures 
Creating a ‘Chinese wall’ between 
compensation procedures and disciplinary 
procedures enables improved access to justice 
and a more efficient compensation scheme, since 
physicians are more ready to hand over the 
relevant information. 
Publication 
type: Policy 
review  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Patient safety 1: 
Admitting to error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling 
physicians to disclose iatrogenic injury through 
the removal of personal liability, applying the 
avoidability criterion and decoupling 
compensation from disciplinary procedures. 
Patient safety 2: 
Learning from 
error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling the 
pooling and sharing of information about 
medical errors and by reframing the 
compensation process as a patient safety 
  
Study Injury focus Context  Outcomes Mechanism Publication 
type and 
relevance 
strategy rather than a risk management 
strategy. 
Wallis (2015)  Medical  
 
New Zealand: No-
blame 
compensation 
schemes 
 
Patient safety 2: 
Learning from 
error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling the 
pooling and sharing of information about 
medical errors and by reframing the 
compensation process as a patient safety 
strategy rather than a risk management 
strategy. 
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Wallis and Dovey 
(2011)  
Medical  
 
New Zealand: No-
blame 
compensation 
schemes 
Patient safety 1: 
Admitting to error  
 
 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling 
physicians to disclose iatrogenic injury through 
the removal of personal liability, applying the 
avoidability criterion and decoupling 
compensation from disciplinary procedures. 
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
Medium  Patient safety 2: 
Learning from 
error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling the 
pooling and sharing of information about 
medical errors and by reframing the 
compensation process as a patient safety 
strategy rather than a risk management 
strategy. 
Xu et al. (2013)  Medical  
 
USA: Tort reform 
only 
 
 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine 
 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Publication 
type: 
Economic 
modelling  
Relevance: 
Medium  
Yang et al. (2009)  Medical  
Birth-related  
 USA: Tort reform 
only 
 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine 
 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
  
Study Injury focus Context  Outcomes Mechanism Publication 
type and 
relevance 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Relevance: 
High  
Yang et al. (2012)  Medical  
Birth-related  
 
USA: Tort reform 
only 
 
Clinical practice 
1: Defensive 
medicine 
 
Tort reform and NFCSs reduce unnecessary tests 
and procedures and improve access to health 
care for patients considered ‘riskier’ by 
clinicians, because doctors are less likely to 
practise positive and/or negative defensive 
medicine to protect themselves from litigation.  
Publication 
type: 
Empirical 
study  
Relevance: 
High  
Patient safety 1: 
Admitting to error 
NFCSs improve patient safety by enabling 
physicians to disclose iatrogenic injury through 
the removal of personal liability, applying the 
avoidability criterion and decoupling 
compensation from disciplinary procedures. 
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